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Abstract
Authentication plays a key role in securing various resources including corporate
facilities or electronic assets. As the most used authentication scheme, knowledge-
based authentication is easy to use but its security is bounded by how much a user can
remember. Biometrics-based authentication requires no memorization but ‘resetting’
a biometric password may not always be possible. Thus, we propose study several
behavioral biometrics (i.e., mid-air gestures) for authentication which does not have
the same privacy or availability concerns as of physiological biometrics.
In this dissertation, we first propose a user-friendly authentication system Kin-
Write that allows users to choose arbitrary, short and easy-to-memorize passwords
while providing resilience to password cracking and password theft. Specifically, we
let users write their passwords (i.e., signatures in the 3D space), and verify a user’s
identity with similarities between the user’s password and enrolled password tem-
plates. Dynamic time warping distance is used for similarity calculation between 3D
passwords samples.
In the second part of the dissertation, we design an authentication scheme that
does not depend on the handwriting contents, i.e., regardless of the written words or
symbols, and adapt challenge-response mechanism to avoid possible eavesdropping,
man-in-the-middle attacks, and reply attacks. We design a MoCRA system that
utilizes Leap Motion to capture users’ writing movements and use writing style to
verify users, even if what they write during the verification is completely different from
what they write during the enrollment. Specifically, MoCRA leverages co-occurrence
matrices to model the handwriting styles, and use a Support Vector Machine (SVM)
v
to accept a legitimate user and reject the rest.
In the third part, we study both security and usability performance on multiple
types of mid-air gestures that used as passwords, including writing signatures in the
air. We objectively quantify the usability performance by metrics related to the enroll
time and the complexity of the gestures, and evaluate the security performance by
the authentication performance. In addition, we subjectively evaluate the gestures
by survey responses from both field subjects who participated in gesture experiments
and on-line subjects who watched a short video on gesture introducing. Finally, we
study the consistency of gestures over samples collected in a two-month period, and
evaluate their security under shoulder surfing attacks.
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1.1 Motivation and Problem Overview
Authentication is one of the most important yet challenging tasks in computer secu-
rity [1, 2]. Naturally, numerous authentication mechanisms have been proposed in
the past, and in general they can be divided into three categories: (a) knowledge-
based, (b) token-based, (c) biometrics-based. Knowledge-based authentication (e.g.,
text passwords) has been widely utilized because of its ease of use and ease of up-
date. Unfortunately, text-password-based authentication verifies the ownership of a
text password instead of a user and thus can suffer from password theft [3]—anyone
with the text password will pass the authentication. It is also restricted by how much
a human can remember—what is hard to guess is often hard to remember [4]. Token-
based authentication frees humans from tedious memorizing. It authenticates users
by examining their pre-assigned tokens, e.g., physical keys, RFID tags, RSA SecureID
tokens, smart cards, smartphones [5], etc. However, such mechanisms are also vulner-
able to token theft. Lost or stolen tokens can easily allow anyone pass authentication.
Finally, biometrics-based mechanisms that utilize physiological biometrics, e.g., fin-
gerprints, voice, facial and iris patterns, are less likely to suffer from identity theft.
However, their applications have received resistance from privacy-savvy users, who
worry that they will be tracked, based on their unique physiological biometrics [6].
To enhance the security of password-based authentication, behavior-biometrics,
such as gestures [7, 8, 9], mouse movements [10, 11], keystroke dynamics [2, 12], have
1
been proposed as a complementary method, which converts authenticating based on
‘what you know’ and ’what you have’ into ‘who you are’. In this work, we focused
on behavioral biometrics as the password of an authentication system. Instead of
writing on a paper or typing on a keyboard, the user can be verified by writing
his/her password in the air using his/her fingertip, which is a 3D password.
We use 3D-signatures in two types of application: authentication based on remem-
bered password, and authentication with challenge-response mechanism. For pass-
word authentication, we let users write pre-selected short texts and use the writing
trajectory as short and convenient passwords. For challenge-response authentication,
we let users passively write any text that act as a response to a challenge question
and thus use content-independent 3D handwriting to continuously identify or verify
a user. Utilizing 3D handwriting as biometrics for authentication is made possible
by the emerging low-cost sensors – the Microsoft Kinecet sensor and the Leap Mo-
tion controller. Kinect sensors are designed as an input device for Microsoft Xbox,
a game controller. Kinect is able to capture depth information up to 8 meters away
and is able to detect up to two human beings. While the newer one, Leap Motion
controller, focuses on a smaller range and is mainly designed for finger detection as a
user operates a computer. Details of two devices will be discussed in later chapters.
After validating the effectiveness of 3D handwriting as an authentication biomet-
rics leveraging thousands of samples, we studied the usability of the 3D handwritings.
Instead of studying the signatures alone, we believe a better way to learn its usability
is compare it with other hand gestures. Thus, we look into other hand gestures, such
as swipe your hand, zoom in or out, which are familiar to user as they had been widely
used on touch screens.
2
1.2 Related Work
Authentication plays a key role in securing various resources including corporate
facilities or electronic assets. Naturally, numerous authentication mechanisms have
been proposed in the past, and in general they can be divided into three categories:
(a) knowledge-based , (b) token- based, (c) biometrics-based.
Knowledge-based authentication (e.g., text passwords) has been widely utilized
because of its ease of use and ease of update. Unfortunately, text-password-based
authentication verifies the ownership of a text password instead of a user and thus
can suffer from password theft (i.e., shoulder surfing) ?anyone with the text pass-
word can pass the authentication. It is also restricted by how much a human can
remember?what is hard to guess is often hard to remember. Graphical passwords are
claimed to be a better solution because humans can remember pictures more easily
than a string of characters. Recognition-based graphical passwords [4, 13] require
users to choose their preselected images from several random pictures for authenti-
cation, and some schemes [14, 15] have been designed to cope with the problem of
shoulder surfing. Another class of graphical passwords asks users to click through
several preselected locations on one image [16]. All those schemes authenticate based
on ‘what you know’.
Token-based authentication frees humans from tedious memorizing. It authenti-
cates users by examining their pre-assigned tokens, e.g., physical keys, RFID tags,
RSA SecureID tokens, smart cards, smartphones [3], etc. However, such mechanisms
are also vulnerable to token theft. Lost or stolen tokens can easily allow anyone pass
authentication. Token-based authentication is based on ‘what you have’.
In comparison, biometrics-based schemes verify ‘who you are’, which are less likely
to suffer from identity theft. Traditional biometrics-based schemes utilize physiologi-
cal biometrics [17], including iris patterns, retina patterns, fingerprints, etc. However,
their applications have received resistance from privacy-savvy users, who worry that
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they will be tracked, based on their unique physiological biometrics. New approaches
utilize behavioral biometrics, such as keystroke dynamics [12, 2] or mouse move-
ments [10, 11] for authentication. A few systems have proposed to use hand gestures
for user verification. Those systems require users to hold a special device in their
hands, such as a phone [7] that captures arm sweep action; a tri-axis accelerome-
ter [8] that captures simple gestures; a biometric smart pen [18] that collects grip
strength, the tilt of the pen, the acceleration, etc. In this work, we work on 3D
passwords, which are belongs to hand gestures. With gestures captured from depth
sensor, the 3D passwords authentication has the advantages of contact free.
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, we study the authentication schemes based on 3D password using
motion sensors. In particular, we first build an authentication scheme based on 3D
signature captured using Kinect. Later, we explore a challenge-response authentica-
tion scheme to verify a user by content-independent handwritings, i.e., user can input
random contents which is completely different from his own enrollment contents. Fi-
nally we study the security and usability performance trade-off on several types of
hand gestures.
We organize the dissertation as follows:
In Chapter 2, we briefly introduce the existing problems on password-based au-
thentication approaches and utilize 3D handwriting signatures as passwords to au-
thenticate a user. Utilizing a DTW algorithm, the system can verify a user by a short
and contact-less signature while effectively preventing possible attackers.
Then we turn to study a authentication scheme that do not rely on contents in
Chapter 3. We design a CiTric system that utilizes a three-level feature extraction
and a SVM classification method. Since a co-occurrence matrix can represent the
writing style of a user, we use it to identify or verify a user based on the writing
4
style of each user. To cope with the possible inside attackers, we utilize a challenge-
response mechanism, to prevent simply replay a previous writing motion process.
In Chapter 4, we study hand gestures collected by Leap motion controllers. We
evaluate security and usability performance on both objective and subjective aspects.
We conduct a survey and collect responses on both security and usability views. We
collect hand gestures and analyze its usability based on complexity and enroll time
metrics, and security based on equal error rate on authentication.
Finally, we conclude the dissertation in Chapter 5.
5
Chapter 2
Authentication using 3D Handwriting Signature
In this chapter we design a user-friendly authentication system (KinWrite) that lets
users write their passwords in 3D space and captures the handwriting movement
using a low cost motion input sensing device – Kinect. Because of the built-in be-
havioral biometrics in handwriting, KinWrite allows users to choose short and easy-
to-memorize passwords while providing resistance to several types of attacks.
2.1 Introduction
The proposed KinWrite allows users to choose short and easy-to-memorize passwords
while providing resilience to password cracking and password theft. The basic idea is
to let a user write her password in space instead of typing it. Writing in space adds
behavioral biometrics to a password (e.g., personal handwriting characteristics) and
creates a large number of personalized passwords that are difficult to duplicate. As a
result, KinWrite inherits the advantages of both password-based and biometrics-based
access control: KinWrite authenticates “who you are” instead of “what you own” or
“ what you know,” and allows users to update their passwords on demand. Hence,
stolen passwords, shoulder surfing [19], and user tracking become less of a threat.
To capture in-space handwriting (hereafter 3D-signature), KinWrite utilizes Kinect [20],
which is a low-cost motion input sensor device capable of recording 3D depth infor-
mation of a human body. Using the depth information, we can detect and track
fingertip motion to obtain a corresponding 3D-signature. Kinect is well-suited for
this task and can be used in various authentication scenarios including door access
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control, because it can operate under almost any ambient light conditions, including
complete darkness [21]. Verifying a user’s identity utilizing 3D-signatures captured
by Kinect seems simple yet appealing. However, several issues make it a challenging
task. First, Kinect is known for its abundant errors and low resolution [22], which
may result in distorted 3D-signature samples, as shown in Figure 2.1. Second, the
same users may produce different 3D-signatures over time. Third, the requirement of
user-friendly design limits the number of 3D-signatures needed for the initial ‘pass-
word’ enrollment, and thus disqualifies many classification algorithms. Last but not
the least, an adversary may try to impersonate a legitimate user. The proposed
system has to be able to reject such attempts virtually all the time.
We illustrate the aforementioned challenges in Figure 2.1: All three signatures
are captured using Kinect when a password of ‘ma’ was written in the space. In
particular, Figure 2.1 (a-b) were written by the same user and Figure 2.1(c) was
generated by an adversary who observed the victim four times and was given the
spelling of the password. Although the adversary was able to generate a signature
closely imitating the genuine one (shown in Figure 2.1 (a)) and the two genuine
signatures appeared to be different, our KinWrite system is able to correctly identify
both genuine signatures and reject the forged one.
The proposed KinWrite system can verify legitimate users and reject attacks well
because it is based on the following intuition. Granted that the shapes of signatures
are important, they may change over time and may be learned after being observed
visually. In contrast, we believe several spontaneous gestures that are embedded in the
movement of in-space handwriting, can characterize each user better and are difficult
to imitate, which we will show through our experiments. A user may write letters
in different sizes or shapes, but the acceleration at turning points and the transition
of consecutive points may not vary much. Thus, to verify a signature, KinWrite
examines not only the shape but also several gesture-related features. Lacking a
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(a) genuine (b) genuine (c) forged
Figure 2.1 (a− b) are genuine signatures. (c) is a forged signature. The same user
may sign the password in 3D space differently while an adversary with knowledge
may be able to imitate the shape of the genuine signature closely. Our KinWrite
system correctly verified the genuine handwriting (a-b) and rejected the forged one
(c).
large number of training signatures, KinWrite utilizes Dynamic TimeWarping (DTW)
to verify signatures, because DTW only requires the storage of one known genuine
signature as a template and can accommodate differences in timing between 3D-
signatures. Compared with traditional online signatures that uses tablets, KinWrite
has the advantage of being contactless, and signing in the 3D-space leaves no traces.
We organize this sections as follows. In Section 4.2, we present the system design
requirements and the attack models, introduce Kinect, and give overview the Kin-
Write architecture. Then, we discuss data processing and feature extraction in Sec-
tion 3.4, and introduce the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)-based verification algo-
rithm in Section 2.5. Finally, we show that KinWrite is effective in verifying users and
rejecting various attackers in Section 3.6 and discuss related work in Section 3.2.2.
2.2 Related Work and Background
2.2.1 Related Work
With the development of digital equipment, online signatures have gradually replaced
offline signatures (images of signatures) for user identification. For instance, pressure
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sensitive tablets can record a sequence of 2D signature coordinates as well as pressure.
Methods to verify such signatures first extract features from either each sample point
or the entire signature [23], and then compare the features against the registered
genuine one. The common classification approaches used for comparison include the
following: the Bayes classifier [24], Support Vector Machine (SVM) [25, 26], Neu-
ral Networks (NN) [27], Hidden Markov Models (HMM) [28, 29], Dynamic Time
Warping (DTW) [30, 31]. Several other systems have also been proposed for classi-
fication: a pan-trajectory-based verification system [32], verifying based on symbolic
features [33], using camera-based signature acquisition [34], or an elastic local-shape-
based model [35], etc.
Both KinWrite and online signature utilize behavioral biometrics: handwritten
signature. Naturally, the two systems share similarity. However, we believe that 3D-
signatures contain richer behavioral information than 2D online signatures captured
by tablets. For instance, gesture features are embedded in 3D-signatures, but are
difficult to include in 2D online signatures. We envision that 3D-signatures, if done
well, can be a good biometric for user authentication.
Hand-drawn pictures have been proposed as one type of graphical passwords. For
instance, Draw-a-Secret (DAS) [36] requires a user to draw a simple picture on a
2D grid, and the user is authenticated if he/she visits the same sequence of grids.
KinWrite can also use graphical drawing instead of handwritten signatures as pass-
words. Nevertheless, in this chapter, we focus on studying handwritten signatures.
Compared with DAS, whose password space is limited by the number of vertices,
KinWrite captures the exact trajectory of a 3D-signaure and thus enables a much
larger password space. Furthermore, with the advantage of writing with an empty
hand, such a no-contact method has its advantage to germ conscious users.
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2.2.2 Background on Kinect
Kinect, because of its low cost and capability to provide depth and human gesture
information, has gained popularity among researchers. It has been used to extract the
contour of human body for human identification [37], detect human behavior [38] (e.g,
walking, running, etc) utilizing skeleton information, recognize sign language [39], and
track a head for augmented reality [40] or fingertips and palms [41]. Kinect is also
used in real-time robotics control and building 3D maps of indoor environments [42].
Our system also utilizes the depth information provided by Kinect to track fingertips,
but the focus of our work is to verify 3D-signatures.
2.3 Data Processing & Feature Extraction
In this section, we describe the techniques to construct a refined 3D-signature from
a raw depth image sequence, and discuss feature extraction and its normalization.
2.3.1 Data Processing
A data preprocessor performs fingertip localization, signature normalization, and
signature smoothing.
Fingertip Localization
Given N frames that capture a 3D-signature, in an ideal case, at each frame t, t =
1, 2, · · · , N , the fingertip (used for the signature) should have the minimum depth.
However, in practice, the minimum-depth pixel in a frame may not always correspond
to it because of various random noises. To address this issue, we enforce the temporal
continuity of the fingertip position in a signature – the fingertip position should
only vary in a small range between two consecutive frames. We use the following
propagation technique – given the fingertip position pr(t) = (prx(t), pry(t), prz(t))T at
the t-th frame, we only search within a small region (40×40 pixels) centered at pr(t)
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in frame (t+ 1) for the fingertip position. Specifically, in this small region, we choose
the pixel with the minimum depth value as pr(t+ 1).
The performance of this frame-by-frame fingertip localization depends highly on
a correct fingertip position in the first frame. To ensure the correct initial position,
we continue to use the temporal continuity and adopt the following initialization
strategy. We choose a small number of the first K = 3 frames, and find the pixel
with the minimum-depth value in each frame. If they show good temporal continuity
(i.e., the identified pixel in a frame is always located in a 40×40 region centered at the
pixel identified in the previous frame), we consider them as the fingertip positions in
these K frames and process all the other frames by using the propagation technique
described above. Otherwise, we remove the first frame of these K frames and add
the next frame to repeat the initialization process until their minimum-depth pixels
show the required temporal continuity, which reflects the reliability of the fingertip
localization in the initial frames.
Scaling and Translation
By connecting the fingertip points sequentially, we get a raw signature, which is a 3D
curve in the x−y−z space. One global feature of a signature is its size, which can be
defined by the size of the bounding box around the signature. The size of a signature
in the x−y image plane may vary when the distance between the user and the Kinect
sensor changes. In addition, users may intentionally sign in a larger or smaller range
during different trials, resulting in different sizes of signatures. To achieve a reliable
verification, we scale the raw 3D-signatures into a 1× 1× 1 bounding box.
To make the different 3D-signatures spatially comparable, we perform a global
translation on each signature so that the rear-right corner of its 3D bounding box
becomes its origin. Finally, we normalize each position such that it follows a normal
























































Figure 2.2 A raw 3D-signature (a Chinese character) and the smoothed one using
a Kalman filter.
tips after the scaling, translation, and normalization to be ps(t) = (psx(t), psy(t), psz(t))T .
Signature Smoothing
As shown in Figure 2.2, the raw 3D-signature obtained by a Kinect is usually highly
jagged and noisy. Such jagged signatures are caused by the limited resolution of
the Kinect depth sensor. For example, a small area around the fingertip may have
similar depths. By selecting the minimum-depth pixel, the above fingertip localization
algorithm may not capture the correct fingertip position.
To address this issue, we apply a Kalman filter to smooth the raw 3D-signatures
that have been normalized. For simplicity, we smooth the three coordinates of the
raw 3D-signature separately. Take the x-coordinate as an example. We denote the
prediction of the underlying fingertip position to be p(t) = (px(t), py(t), pz(t))T at
the t-th frame and define the state x(t) = (px(t), ṗx(t), p̈x(t))T at the t-th frame
as a vector of the predicted fingertip position, velocity and acceleration. The state
transition of the Kalman filter is then x(t) = Ax(t− 1) +wx(t). Based on the theory








where 4t is the time interval between two consecutive frames. Given the typical rate
of 30 frames per second for a Kinect sensor, we have 4t = 130 seconds.
For the observation in the x coordinate, we only have the raw fingertip position
psx(t) but no velocity or acceleration. Thus, we can write an observation equation for
the Kalman filter as psx(t) = cx(t) + vx(t), where c = (1 0 0). We model the process
noise wx(t) and the measurement noise vx(t) to be zero-mean Gaussian distributions.
For the process noise, we choose the same covariance matrix Qx for all the frames.
More specifically, Qx is a 3 × 3 diagonal matrix with three identical diagonal ele-
ments, which equals the variance of acceleration (along x coordinate) estimated from
psx(t), t = 1, 2, · · · , N . For the measurement noise, we choose the time-independent
variance vx as the variance of the fingertip positions (i.e., psx(t), t = 1, 2, · · · , N). Fol-
lowing the same procedure, we set the state-transition and observation equations for y
and z coordinates. With the state-transition equation and the observation equation,
we use the standard Kalman filter algorithm to calculate a smoothed 3D-signature
with refined fingertip positions p(t), t = 1, 2, · · · , N . Figure 2.2 shows an example
comparing the raw 3D-signature with the smoothed one.
2.3.2 Feature Extraction
Feature Selection
Based on the refined signature that connects p(t), t = 1, 2, · · · , N , we extract various
features for verification. As discussed earlier, one major advantage of KinWrite is
to use simple, easy-to-remember passwords as the basis of 3D-signatures to provide
a user friendly authentication method. Given a simple-shape signature, global fea-
tures, such as the central position and the average velocity, usually do not contain
much useful information for distinguishing different signatures. Thus, we extract the
following six types of local features at each point and obtain a feature vector of 14
dimensions, as summarized in Table 3.1.
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Table 2.1 The summary of six types (14−dimension) of 3D features extracted from
smoothed 3D-Signatures.
Type Features
Positions & Distance p(t), d(t)
Velocity ṗ(t)
Acceleration ‖p̈(t)‖
Slope angle θxy(t), θzx(t),
Path angle α(t)
Log radius of curvature log 1
κ(t)
1. Position and Position Difference between Frames. The fingertip position in the
t-th frame is denoted as
p(t) = (px(t), py(t), pz(t))T ,
and the inter-frame position difference is defined as
d(t) = ‖p(t+ 1)− p(t)‖.
2. Velocity. The velocity of the position in the t-th frame is defined as
ṗ(t) = (ṗx(t), ṗy(t), ṗz(t))T .
3. Acceleration. The magnitude of acceleration for the t-th frame is defined as
‖p̈(t)‖.









5. Path Angle α(t) is the angle between lines p(t)p(t + 1) and p(t − 1)p(t), as












Figure 2.3 An illustration of path angle and curvature.
6. Curvature. The last feature extracted for the i-th frame is the log radius of
curvature of the signature at p(t), i.e., log 1




c2zy(t) + c2xz(t) + c2yx(t)
(ṗ(t)2x + ṗ2y(t) + ṗ2z(t))3/2
,
where
czy(t) = p̈z(t)× ṗy(t)− p̈y(t)× ṗz(t).
For each frame t, the feature extractor constructs a 14 dimensional feature vector;
we denote it as f(t). Then, for a 3D-signature sample p(t), t = 1, 2, · · · , N , the feature
extractor constructs a sequence of feature vectors f(t), t = 1, 2, · · · , N . Figure 2.4
shows some of the features along x, y, and z coordinates for four 3D-signature samples.
For ease of reading, we show the feature vectors derived from the raw 3D-signature
samples prior to data processing. We observe that the 3D-signature samples from the
same user did appear to be similar, which is the basis of verifying users according to
their 3D-signatures.
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Figure 2.4 The position comparison of four 3D-signature samples: two ‘SA’
3D-signatures were signed by the same user, ‘USC’ and ‘JASON’ were from
different users. The two ‘SA’ 3D-signature samples show a larger degree of
similarity than the others.
Feature Processing
In practice, the values of different features may have different ranges, but their rele-
vancy towards the correct verification are not necessarily determined by their ranges.
For example, a path angle has a range of [−π, π] while the position px(t) has been
scaled to the range of [0, 1]. This does not mean that a path angle is 3 times more
relevant than a position. Thus, we perform two-step feature processing: normaliza-
tion and weight selection. First, we normalize each feature such that it conforms to
a normal Gaussian distribution N(0, 1) over all the frames. Second, we weigh each
feature differently to achieve a better performance. To obtain the weight for each
feature (dimension), we selected a small set of training samples for each signature
(e.g., n = 4 samples for each signature), and verified these training samples using
the DTW classifier (to be discussed in Section 2.5) based on one feature (dimension).
For each feature (dimension), we obtain a verification rate for each signature, i.e.,
the percentage of genuine samples in the top n = 4 ranked samples, and we simply
consider the average verification rate over all signatures as the weight for this feature
(dimension). The intuition is that a feature that leads to a higher verification rate
should be assigned a larger weight. Our experimental results show that the proposed
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feature normalization and weighting can substantially improve the verification results.
2.4 KinWrite Overview
The KinWrite system consists of a Kinect for capturing 3D-signatures, a secure storage
for storing abstracts of enrolled 3D-signature templates, and a computing unit for
processing data and verifying users. KinWrite, as an authentication system, can be
used for various authentication scenarios. Considering that the range of a Kinect
sensor is about 0.8m to 4m, KinWrite can work well for office building access control.
For instance, a Kinect can be installed at the entrance of a building.
To enter the building, a user approaches the Kinect and signs her password towards
it. Then, KinWrite will process the captured raw 3D-signature, and authenticate the
user by comparing it with the already enrolled genuine 3D-signature.
In this section, we discuss the design requirement of KinWrite, the attack model,
the intuition of using a Kinect, and the system architecture.
2.4.1 System Requirements
Rapid Enrollment. Creating new user accounts or updating existing user accounts
should be quick, so that users can set up and reset their 3D-signature passwords
easily.
Rapid Verification. The authentication process should require no more than a
few seconds.
No Unauthorized Access. One key factor that determines the success of Kin-
Write is how likely an unauthorized user can pass the authentication. While a bullet-
proof system is costly to achieve and may degrade user experiences, KinWrite should
ensure that it takes a non-trivial amount of effort for an adversary to impersonate a
legitimate user, at least be harder than guessing text-based passwords randomly.
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Low False Negative. Users will become frustrated if it takes several attempts to
input an acceptable 3D-signature. Thus, KinWrite should have a low false negative,
despite several variances that may occur over multiple authentication sessions. For
instance, 3D-signatures of the same user may change over time; the distance between
a user and a Kinect may vary, affecting the captured 3D-signatures.
Around-the-Clock Use. Similar to most authentication systems, KinWrite is
expected to work around the clock, regardless of the weather or lighting conditions.
2.4.2 Attack Model
Several mechanisms can be used to protect KinWrite. For instance, opaque panels
can be installed at the entrance of a building to block shoulder surfing, and raw
3D-signatures shall never be stored to avoid insider attacks. Nevertheless, we study
possible attacks for impersonating legitimate users assuming those protection mech-
anisms are unavailable.
• Random Attack: With no prior knowledge of genuine 3-D signatures, an
attacker can randomly sign 3D-signatures and hope to pass the authentication.
This is equivalent to a brute force attack against text-based password schemes.
• Observer Attack: In an observer attack, an adversary is able to visually
observe how a user signs her password once or multiple times and then try to
imitate her 3D-signature.
• Content-Aware Attack: In a content-aware attack, an adversary knows the
corresponding spelling of a legitimate user’s 3D-signature, but has not observed
how the user signs it in space. The correct spelling can be obtained through
social engineering or by an educated guess based on the user’s name, hobbies,
etc.
• Educated Attack: In an educated attack, an attacker is aware of the spelling
of a 3D-signature and has observed multiple times how a user signs her pass-
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(a) Ob-1 (b) Ob-4 (c) CA&Ob-4 (d) CA (e) CA (f) Insider
Figure 2.5 Signatures (‘ma’) signed by two persons mimicking various attackers.
User 1 signed (a)-(c), and user 2 signed (d)-(f). (a) An observer attacker with one
observation, (b) an observer attacker with four observations, (c) an educated
attacker knowing the spelling and observed four times, (d)-(e) content-aware
attackers with known spelling but unaware of the shape of the signature, (f) insider
attacker knowing the shape of 3D-signature.
word. That is, an educated attack is the combination of an observer attack and
a content-aware attack.
• Insider Attack: An insider attacker can obtain the spelling of a signature,
the corresponding trajectory (i.e., the one shown in Figure 2.5), and she can
observe how a user signs in space. That is, an insider attacker is an educated
attacker who knows the signature trajectory. We note signature trajectories
are difficult to obtain, since in practice a KinWrite system should never store
such information permanently nor display 3D-signatures. Although unlikely to
happen, we include this uncommon attack in order to evaluate the performance
of KinWrite under extreme attacks.
To obtain an intuition on how well the aforementioned attackers can imitate 3D-
signatures, we had two users act as attackers and recorded their 3D-signatures when
trying to forge the genuine 3D-signature shown in Figure 2.1 (a). For the first user,
we demonstrated the motion of signing ‘ma’ four times, and then informed him what
was written in the space, i.e., we had him act as an observer attacker first then as
an educated attacker. For the second user, we asked him to write ‘ma’ multiple
times without demonstrating the motion but gave him the spelling, and then showed
the trajectory of the genuine 3D-signature, i.e., we had him act as a content-aware
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attacker then as an insider attacker. Figure 2.5 illustrates the signatures signed by
the two users, from which we obtain the following intuition: Observing the signing
process alone seems to help an attacker to imitate the shape of signatures. However,
increasing the number of observations of the signing process does not necessarily
improve the forgery in this case. This is encouraging. A larger-scaled experiment
that were carried out over five months will be reported in Section 3.6.
2.4.3 3D-Signature Acquisition Using a Kinect
Basics of a Kinect. A Kinect is a motion input sensing device launched by Microsoft
for Xbox 360, Xbox One and Windows PCs. A Kinect has three sensors: an RGB
camera, a depth sensor, and a multi-array microphone. The depth sensor consists of
an infrared projector and a monochrome CMOS sensor, which measures the distance
between the object and the camera plane at each pixel. With the depth sensor, a
Kinect can capture the 3D structure of an object under almost any ambient light
conditions [21], including complete darkness. Figure 2.6 shows example pictures
captured by a Kinect: an RGB image of a user who was signing his password and the
corresponding depth image. A depth image is shown as a grayscale image, where a
darker pixel represents a smaller depth. In this case, the hand of the user is closest
to the Kinect.
Why Kinect? We track the hand movement from the captured 3D depth in-
formation of the body, with which we can identify the underlying 3D-signatures for
verification. This is much more effective than using classical RGB sensors which can-
not capture the motion along the depth direction (perpendicular to the image plane).
The motion along the depth direction contains important gesture information and
can help distinguish 3D-signatures from different subjects. Such information is usu-
ally difficult to track from a 2D RGB video, especially when the light is weak or the
hand and surrounding background bear a similar color. Before the release of Kinect,
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(a) an original image (b) a depth image
Figure 2.6 The RGB and depth images captured by a Kinect.
other commercialized depth sensors had been used for human posture tracking and
gesture recognition [43]. However, these commercialized depth sensors are usually
too expensive and only applicable in restricted lab environments [44].
Feasibility of Kinect. Kinect was originally designed for gaming with the goal
of capturing the body motion of a player. Will a Kinect suffice for acquiring 3D-
signatures? There are two factors determining the applicability of Kinect: the sam-
pling rate and working range. A Kinect can capture 30 frames per second; each frame
has a resolution of 240× 320 pixels (newer version has a resolution of 480× 640 pix-
els), which is lower than the typical sampling rate (100Hz) in digitizing tablets (used
for capturing online signatures). However, the maximum frequencies underlying the
human body kinematics are always under 20-30 Hz [45], and the Kinect sampling rate
is sufficiently dense for signatures [30]. The working range of the Kinect depth sensor
is between 0.8m to 4m (the new version of Kinect can capture the depth from 0.4m
to 8m), which works well for the proposed application; For example, at the door of
the building, we can allocate an area within the working range of a Kinect, in which
a user can move her hand towards the Kinect.
What to Track? One key question is which part of the hand shall be tracked to
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generate 3D-signatures? For the purpose of modeling, we usually require a signature
to be a temporal sequence of points with an infinitely small size. Among the options
for tracking, e.g., a fingertip, the whole palm or fist, we found the whole palm or
fist performs worse than a fingertip because of its relatively large size, with which
we cannot find the motion center accurately enough to create a 3D-signature with
sufficient spatial resolution. Thus, we track the finger tip, whose corresponding region
in the depth map is small, and we can simply take its geometry center as a point on
a 3D-signature. As such, we envision that a user will extend his hand in front of his
body and use one of his fingers to sign towards the Kinect, as shown in Figure 2.6 (a).
The regions with the smallest value in the Kinect depth map will correspond to the
positions of the fingertip most of the time. Note that without a pen, people usually
move their fingertips to describe what they want to write. Therefore, the proposed
setting of using fingertips for signatures should be natural and spontaneous to most
people.
Although Kinect produces depth images that greatly facilitate 3D-signature ac-
quisition, the errors of the depth measurements can be from several millimeters up
to about 4cm [42], affecting the accuracy of acquired 3D-signatures. We discuss the
mechanisms to address such large measurement errors in Section 3.4 .
2.4.4 KinWrite Architecture
Like other authentication systems, authenticating via KinWrite consists of two phases:
enrollment and verification. During an enrollment, a user will create an account
and enter a few 3D-signatures. Then, KinWrite will first process these genuine 3D-
signatures and select one sample as the template for this user. During the authen-
tication phase, a user signs her password towards a Kinect. After preprocessing the
newly entered 3D-signature, KinWrite will compare it with the stored template. A



















































































Data Preprocessor Feature Extractor
Figure 2.7 Flow chart of KinWrite. The computing component of KinWrite consists
of a data preprocessor, a feature extractor, a template selector, and a verifier.
will deny access.
The computing unit of KinWrite consists of a data preprocessor, a feature extrac-
tor, a template selector, and a verifier, as shown in Figure 2.7. The data preprocessor
takes frames captured by a Kinect and outputs a 3D-signature. In particular, the
data preprocessor identifies the position of the fingertip that is used for signing a
password in the space. By sequentially connecting the fingertips in all frames, Kin-
Write constructs a raw 3D-signature. Since the size of the raw 3D-signature depends
on the distance between a user and the Kinect, we add a data processing step to
remove the size difference. Then, a Kalman filter is applied to further reduce the
spatial noise in the 3D-signature, and features are extracted for verification.
We discuss the technical details of the data preprocessor and the feature extractor
in Section 3.4, and the template selector and the verifier in Section 2.5.
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2.5 Template Selection and Verification
In this section, we elaborate on algorithms to verify users, based on their 3D-signatures.
2.5.1 Why Dynamic Time Warping
A good verification algorithm should perform accurately without requiring a large
number of training samples, because from the usability perspective, it is unpleasant
to collect a large number of training samples when a user enrolls herself.
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) are well-known statistical learning algorithms
used in classical signature-based verification systems and have shown good verification
accuracy. However, HMM usually requires a large training set (i.e., representative
signature samples) to construct an accurate model. With the usability constraints,
it is difficult to perform well, as has been validated with our experiments. Thus,
we use Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), where one good template is sufficient for
verification.
We use DTW to quantify the difference between two 3D-signature samples. In-
stead of directly calculating the feature difference in the corresponding frames, DTW
allows nonrigid warping along the temporal axis, shown in Figure 2.8.
To some degree, time warping can compensate the feature difference caused by
the signing speed. For instance, a user may sign her 3D-signature slowly one day and
quickly another day. Given two 3D-signature samples, we denote their feature vectors
as f1(t), t = 1, 2, · · · , N1 and f2(s), s = 1, 2, · · · , N2, and construct a N1×N2 distance
matrix D with an element dts = ‖f1(t) − f2(s)‖, t = 1, 2, · · · , N1, s = 1, 2, · · · , N2.
DTW finds a non-decreasing path in D, starting from d11 and ending at dN1N2 , such
that the total value of the elements along this path is minimum. This minimum
total value is defined as the DTW distance between the two 3D-signature samples;
we denote it as d(f1, f2). Figure 2.9 illustrates such an example.
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(a) Euclidean distance (b) dynamic time warping distance
Figure 2.8 An illustration of the comparison between Euclidian distance and DTW
distance. Both figures show the matching between two temporal series. (a) utilize
the Euclidean distance to match the two series by their indecies, while (b) utilize
the dynamic time warping method to match them at the corresponding positions
with similar features.
Figure 2.9 An illustration of DTW.
2.5.2 Template Selection
Utilizing DTW as the verification algorithm, during the enrollment phase for a user u,
we simply choose the most representative 3D-signature sample fu from the training
set, which we call the template (3D-signature) of the user u. With this template,
we can verify a test 3D-signature sample f of the user u by evaluating their DTW
25
distance d(fu, f): If the DTW distance is larger than a threshold dT , the verification
fails. Otherwise, the verification succeeds.
How well KinWrite performs is determined by the choice of the template. To select
a template for each user, we use a distance-based strategy and consider only her own
training samples. In this strategy, given n training 3D-signature samples f1, f2, · · · , fn
for a user u, we calculate the pairwise DTW distance d(fi, fj), i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n, and







d(fi, fj), i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (2.2)
2.5.3 Threshold Selection
Another important issue for verifying a 3D-signature sample is threshold selection.
The 3D-signatures from different users may have different thresholds, and therefore
we select a threshold dT for each user. Since most verification systems prefer to
reduce unauthorized accesses to minimum, we aim to select a threshold that leads to
a zero false positive rate for the training samples, i.e., training signature samples that
are not from a user u cannot pass the verification. During the enrollment phase, we
calculate the DTW distance between the template of a user u and all the M training
samples (from all the users), and sort them. We find the first training sample in the
sorted list that is not from the user u. Then, the DTW distance between this sample
and the template of the user u is the upper bound of dT , and we select a dT that
is smaller than the upper-bound to achieve a higher level of security. Figure 2.10
shows an example of M = 10 training samples. The x-axis gives the indices of the
training samples and the y-axis is their DTW distance to the template of the user
u. Along the x-axis, the samples that are labeled ‘+’ are genuine training samples
from the user u while samples labeled ‘-’ are training samples from other users. In
this case, the upper-bound of dT is the distance between the template and the first
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Upper bound of dT
Samples
Figure 2.10 An illustration of threshold selection.
‘-’ sample along the x-axis. In the experiment, we tried various threshold values to
construct the precision-recall curve and the ROC curve, and hence to evaluate the
system performance comprehensively.
2.6 Experiment and Evaluation
In this section, we present experiment results to justify the proposed verification
method.
2.6.1 Data Acquisition
We use the Microsoft Kinect for data collection. In our collected data, each sample
is a short video clip that captures the motion of signing one 3D-signature sample.
The length of the video clip may vary for each sample, but typically is in the range
of [2, 12] seconds. We set the frame rate to the maximum allowed value (i.e., 30
frames per second), and set the resolution of the depth image to 240 × 320 pixels.
The distance between the user and the Kinect was not fixed, but was in the range
of [1.5, 2.5] meters. We alternated three Kinect sensors for data collection and did
not differentiate samples collected by different Kinect sensors to validate that our
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algorithm is insensitive to individual Kinect sensors.
In total, we studied 18 users, allowing each user to enroll up to two different 3D-
signatures (e.g., ‘ma’ and ’Bry’ are from the same user). In total, these users provided
35 different 3D-signatures, which we call signatures hereafter. For each signature, we
collected 18 to 47 3D-signature samples over a period of five months so that we could
capture the possible 3D-signature variation over time. We collected fewer samples
for some signatures because the users were not always available over the entire five
months of data collection. In total, we collected 1180 genuine 3D-signature samples
for 35 signatures, and hereafter we call these samples the genuine samples.
We further collected attack data to evaluate the security performance of KinWrite
against impersonation attempts. In particular, we chose four signatures as the ‘vic-
tims’, and for each victim, we collected five types of attack samples that simulate five
different attack models.
• CA. We chose six attackers to launch content-aware attacks. We gave them the
spelling of the victims’ passwords, without any hint of the passwords’ geometry
or shape. Then, each of these six attackers produced 10 forged 3D-signature
samples for each victim. In total we collected 6 × 10 × 4 = 240 CA attack
3D-signature samples.
• Ob-1. We selected a different group of 12 attackers to perform observer attacks.
Each of them watched the signing process of each victim once and then produced
five forged 3D-signature samples. Given the four victims, we collected 12× 5×
4 = 240 Ob-1 attack samples.
• Ob-4. The same 12 attackers continued to observe the signing process of each
victim three more times (in total four times) and then produced five forged
3D-signature samples. In total, we collected 12 × 5 × 4 = 240 Ob-4 attack
3D-signature samples.
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• CA-Ob4. After collecting the Ob-4 samples, we gave the same 12 attackers
the spelling of the passwords. Then, each of these 12 attackers produced five
new forged 3D-signatures for each victim. In total we collected 12×5×4 = 240
CA-Ob4 attack 3D-signature samples.
• Insider. We told six attackers the spelling, showed them three representative
3D-signature samples of each victim (printout on papers), and let them watch
the signing process of each victim once. Each of these six attackers then pro-
duced 10 forged 3D-signature samples for each victim. This way, we collected
6× 10× 4 = 240 Insider attack 3D-signature samples in total.
Combining all five types of samples, we collected 240 × 5 = 1, 200 attack 3D-
signature samples. From CA samples to Insider samples, the attackers gained an
increasing amount of prior knowledge about the victims, representing a broad range
of security threats to KinWrite.
2.6.2 Evaluation Metrics
We adopted standard ROC curves and precision-recall curves to evaluate the perfor-
mance of KinWrite. For each threshold dT , we tried m rounds. For round i, the
classification results can be divided into the following four categories: tpi, the number
of true positives; tni, the number of true negatives; fpi, the number of false positives,
and fni, the number of false negatives.
Precision is the percentage of honest users out of all the users that have passed
verification, and it reflects how cautious the system is to accept a user. A secure

























Figure 2.11 The impact of the sample size on the feature weight selection: The
weights obtained over a randomly selected training set with 4 samples are similar to
the one obtained over all samples.
Recall is the number of true positives over the sum of true positives and false
negatives. It quantifies the fraction of honest users that have been granted access out








A recall of 100% indicates that an honest user can always pass the verification at
her first trial. A recall of 50% indicates that an honest user has a 50% probability of
gaining access. On average it takes 2 trials to pass the verification.
ROC curve stands for receiver operating characteristic curve and is a plot of
true positive rate (TPR) over false positive rate (FPR). An ideal system has 100%
TPR and 0% FPR, i.e., all honest users can pass the verification while none of the














By varying the threshold dT , we can achieve varied precision, recall, TPR and
FPR values with which we can draw precision-recall curves and ROC curves.
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2.6.3 Evaluation Results
We performed two sets of experiments utilizing the 3D-signature samples collected
over five months. The first set of experiments studied the performance of KinWrite in
a normal scenario, where honest users want to authenticate themselves. The second
set of experiments studied the performance of KinWrite under various attacks.
Normal Case Performance
In our first set of experiments, we divided the genuine samples into two sets: a
training set and a test set. We randomly selected a subset of n genuine samples for
each of the 35 signatures as their training samples and let the remaining samples
be the test set. KinWrite selected a template for each signature from the training
samples, and then used the test samples to evaluate the verification performance. To
study the statistical performance of KinWrite, we conducted 30 rounds of random
folding, where for each round, a different set of n samples were selected as training
samples. We reported the performance over the 30 rounds of experiments and for all
35 signatures.
Training Size. We first conducted experiments to evaluate the impact of training
size n on the verification performance. In each round, we randomly selected n samples
as the training samples. In total, M = 35 · n training samples were selected for all
signatures. For each signature, our template selector chose one template and sorted
all M training samples according to the DTW distances, as shown in Figure 2.10.
By varying the threshold dT , we obtained a ROC curve and a precision-recall curve.
As we tried n in the range of [2, 12], we obtained a set of ROC curves and a set of
precision-recall curves, as shown in Figure 2.12, where performance for each value
of n is over 30 rounds and 35 signatures. We observe that the performance is not
too sensitive to the selection of n as long as n > 2, and when n > 2, KinWrite can
almost achieve a precision of 100% and a recall of 90%. Thus in the remainder of our
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Figure 2.12 Training performance of KinWrite with different n, the number of
training samples for each signature. For ROC curves, the range of x-axis is [0, 0.4]
and the range of y-axis is [0.6, 1].
experiments, we chose n = 4.
KinWrite Performance. Figure 2.13 shows the test performance (ROC and
precision-recall curves) of the 35 signatures when the training sample size is 4. As
before, we tried 30 rounds of random folding for each signature, and each curve
represents the performance result averaged over all 30 rounds for a signature.
Our experimental results show that given a requirement of a 100% precision, we
can achieve at least a 70% recall or a 99% recall on average. Assuming that 3D-
signature samples are independent, the probability that an honest user passes verifi-
cation is about 70%. Since the number of successes of n trials can be considered as a
Binomial distribution, the average number of trials for a user to pass the verification
is 170% . In Figure 2.14, we show the averages of maximum achievable recall for each
signature when the precision was 100%, from which we observed the following: 17
out of 35 signatures can achieve a 100% recall; 13 signatures achieved a recall higher
than 95%, and the rest achieved a recall higher than 85%. The results suggest that
as with text passwords, some 3D-signatures are better then others. Nevertheless in
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Figure 2.13 The performance of KinWrite (by signatures) in normal cases. Each
colored curve indicates the performance of verifying one signature.

















(a) Achieved Recall when the Precision is at 100%
Figure 2.14 The performance of KinWrite in normal cases: the averages and
standard deviations of the achievable recall at a 100% precision.
our experiments, KinWrite can verify an honest user by 1.4 trials on average without
false positives.
Feature Weight Selection and Its Impact. Since the relevancy level of each
feature (dimension) varies for verifying a 3D-signature, we weigh each feature differ-
ently in order to achieve a high verification performance. Weights are selected based
on the verification rate obtained purely on a small training set. To understand how
sensitive weight selection is to training samples, we calculated weights when different
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sets of the samples were used. In the first set of experiments, we randomly selected
4 samples from each signature as the training samples. In total, M = 140 training
samples were selected for all signatures. For each signature, we calculated the DTW
distance between training samples based on only a single feature. We chose the weight
of that feature as the average verification rate of all 35 signatures (i.e., the percentage
of true samples out of the top-ranked 4 samples, when verifiying each signature using
all M samples). We repeated the process 10 rounds by selecting 10 different training
sets for each signature, and depicted the derived weights in Figure 2.11. We observed
that the weights obtained over training sample sets are similar to each other. We
also calculated the weights by considering all the available samples (shown in Fig-
ure 2.11). The resulting weights are similar to the ones derived based on training
sets, suggesting that weight selection over a small training set suffices.
To evaluate the impact of weighted features on verification performance, we mod-
ified KinWrite so that all 14 dimensions of the features were equally weighted. Fig-
ure 2.15 (a, e) show the verification performance on all 35 signatures of this modified
KinWrite. The results demonstrate that the proposed weighting features can improve
the verification performance.
The Role of Dynamic Time Warping. The proposed DTW allows non-
rigid warping along the temporal axis when measuring the difference between two
signatures. To understand the impact of nonrigid warping on the verification perfor-
mance, we defined the difference between two signatures (in the form of features) f1(t),
t = 1, 2, · · · , N1 and f2(t), t = 1, 2, · · · , N2 as follows. We re-sampled the signature
features so that they had the same length, e.g., N = 50 points, and then calculated
the Euclidean distance between the two signature feature vectors. Figure 2.15 (b, f)
shows the verification performance (on all 35 signatures) when using this difference
metric without warping along the temporal axis. The results show that the use of
nonrigid warping in DTW can substantially improve the verification performance.
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(f) Without time warp-
ing








































Figure 2.15 The performance comparison of various methods (by signatures) in
normal cases. Each colored curve indicates the performance of verifying one
signature. The top row shows the precision-recall curves, and the bottom one shows
the ROC curves.
Impact of Kalman Filter and Feature Normalization. We conducted ex-
periments to justify the choice of Kalman filter and feature normalization. First, we
modified our KinWrite so that the Kalman filter was not included, or a different fea-
ture normalization method was used by the data preprocessor, and then we conducted
the experiment as before. Figure 2.15 (c, g) show the verification performance on all
35 signatures when features were normalized linearly to the range of [0, 1]. The results
show that the proposed feature normalization method based on N(0, 1) distribution
leads to a better performance. Figure 2.15 (d, h) show the verification performance
on all 35 signatures when the signatures were not smoothed by the proposed Kalman




In the attack experiments, we evaluated how robust KinWrite is against various types
of attackers. We selected four signatures as the victims with the spelling being “Bry",
“Jy", “ma", and “Tj", respectively. We considered the other 31 signatures acquired
for the first set of experiments as random attackers and collected forged data for all
types of attackers described in Section 2.6.1. Similar to the first set of experiments,
we divided samples into two sets: a training set and a test set. For each type of
attack, the training set of a victim signature consists of 4 randomly chosen samples
from each victim signature and this type of attacker samples. The test set contains
the rest of the samples from all victims and this type of attacker.
For each type of attacker, we performed 30 rounds of random folding. We averaged
precision-recall curves and ROC curves over 30 rounds for each victim and showed
performance results in Figure 2.16, where each type of attacker has four identical-
colored curves with each corresponding to one of the four victims. The results show
that KinWrite can with a high probability reject random attackers. ‘Random’ indi-
cates a brute force attack– an attacker who has no clue about the 3D-signatures and
signs random texts hoping to pass the verification. The results suggest that KinWrite
is robust against brute force attacks. For other types of attacks, Kinwrite did not
perform as well as for the random attacks, which is not surprising since these types
of attackers had partial information about the signatures.
In Figure 2.17 (a), we summarized the maximum achievable recall for each victim
under all attack models, when the precision is required to be 100%. This figure
provides insight on the trade-off between security and usability. For instance, operator
#1 may aim to tune KinWrite so that it can prevent random attackers from passing
verification with a high confidence, while operator #2 may tune KinWrite to block
insider attackers. As a result, on average fewer trials are required for an honest user
to pass verification in the first system than in the second system. Figure 2.17 (b)
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(b) Achievable precision at a 75% recall
Figure 2.17 The performance (by signature) in various attack scenarios.
shows the precision when the recall was 75%. This figure illustrates how easily an
attacker can pass verification, when an operator decides to tune KinWrite so that
users can pass verification by 175% trials on average. In our experiments, we observed
that CA attackers, Ob attackers, and CA&Ob-4 attackers had a slightly higher chance
to pass verification than random attackers, but KinWrite would reject all of them (5
types) with a probability of 97% on average and reject insider attackers with a 75%
probability on average.
In addition, the results suggest that the choice of signature affects the performance
of KinWrite, since some signatures are more robust to shoulder surfing than others.
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For instance, the signature ‘Tj’ is the hardest to imitate among all four signatures,
and watching the signing motion multiple times did not improve the imitation. In
comparison, the signature ‘Bry’ was the easiest to mimic, and observing multiple
times helped. The feedback from ‘attackers’ reveals the reason: ‘Bry’ was signed
much more slowly than ‘Tj’. Hence, the slow motion of ‘Bry’ made imitation easier
while the fast motion and the ambiguous shape of the signature ‘Tj’ made the task
difficult. Interestingly, after we gave the spelling of the signatures ‘Bry’ and ‘Tj’ to
the Ob-4 attackers, they could no longer mimic as well as they used to, because they
started to write the text in their own style instead of purely emulating the signature
motion.
In summary, our experiments show that KinWrite can reject most attackers with
a high probability. Even with a strong attacker (i.e., an insider attacker), KinWrite
perform gracefully. In real application scenarios, many of these attacks, especially
Insider attacks, can be prevented by physical protection or by a good system design.
For instance, knowing the exact shape of a 3D-signature will increase the chances of
a successful attack, and thus KinWrite does not display the signed 3D-signature in
real time and only stores the normalized feature vectors of templates.
2.7 Chapter Summary
We have designed a behavior-based authentication system called KinWrite that can
be used for building access control. By letting users sign their passwords in 3D
space, we turned short and easy-to-crack passwords into behavioral biometrics, i.e,
3D-signatures. KinWrite utilizes Kinect, a low-cost motion input sensor, to capture
fingertip movement when a user signs her password in space, and constructs a 3D
signature. To verify a user, based on her 3D-signatures that may change over time,
we extracted features that are likely to contain personal gesture information, and
we used Dynamic Time Warping to calculate the similarity between samples. One
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advantage of using DTW is that KinWrite only needs to store one template for each
user. To evaluate the performance of KinWrite, we collected 1180 samples for 35
different signatures over five months. In addition, we modeled 5 types of attackers
who tried to impersonate a legitimate user, and collected 1200 3D signature samples
from 18 ‘attackers’. The evaluation results obtained using these samples show a
100% precision, and a 99% recall on average in the presence of random attackers,
e.g., an attacker trying to impersonate a legitimate user in a brute force manner; a
100% precision and a 77% recall on average for all attackers. These results suggest
that KinWrite can deny the access requests from all unauthorized users with a high
probability, and honest users can acquire access with 1:3 trials on average.
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Chapter 3
Challenge-Response Authentication using In-air
Handwriting Style Verification
Passwords, because of their ease of use, are commonly used as an authentication
method to control access to systems. Unfortunately, the tendency of choosing poor
passwords enables an adversary to crack passwords easily by using a brute-force
search or shoulder surfing [46, 15], making passwords a weak authentication method.
Nevertheless, passwords are unlikely to be replaced in the foreseeable future.
In this chapter we use a content-independent handwriting authentication system
(MoCRA) that lets users enroll themselves by writing 3D-passwords in the air yet get
authenticated later even by writing different contents (words or symbols). Working
with a challenge-response mechanism, MoCRA can be used as a one-time authenti-
cation; without explicit verification input, MoCRA allows users to continuously get
identified or verified – simply authenticating by harvesting handwriting styles dur-
ing the writing process. In this chapter, we introduce the system by presenting the
challenge-response framework and details on how to authenticate a user with ran-
dom content. The handwriting movements are captured by a low-cost motion input
sensing device – Leap Motion controller.
3.1 Introduction
User authentication is one of the most important yet challenging tasks in computer se-
curity [1, 2]. The difficulty stems from the insecure communication, where eavesdrop-
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ping, man-in-the-middle attacks, and replay attacks are all made possible. Challenge-
response (CR) authentication can effectively cope with these attacks: typically, during
a CR authentication, one party (e.g., a server) sends a random challenge. To be au-
thenticated, the other party (e.g., a user) has to send back a valid response, which is
usually the hash of the challenge and the secret shared by the two parties beforehand.
Because the challenge is randomly selected and it is difficult to extract the password
from the response, CR authentication is considered secure over insecure communica-
tion channels. However, such a challenge response method authenticates is based on
what you know instead of who you are. Anyone knowing the shared secret can pass
the authentication. Such authentication cannot prevent insider attacks, which are
serious threats to systems with strict security requirements. For instance, enterprise
or government may only allow the security guards who have passed extensive back-
ground checks to patrol their buildings. Letting their friends or colleagues without
background checks substitute them is not allowed and can lead to an insider attack.
To address it, we study biometric-based challenge-response schemes to authenticate
based on who you are. Compared with authentication using biometrics, adding the
procedure of challenge-response will introduce an extra amount of time to verify the
response. Nevertheless, we believe the challenge-response procedure can reduce the
possibility of replay attacks.
Both physical and behavioral biometrics can be used to identify who you are.
Considering that physical biometrics are not privacy-friendly and are limited in num-
bers, we focus on designing a behavioral-biometric-based CR authentication system.
We propose to use in-air handwriting style as a new biometrics for authentication.
Using a depth motion sensor, Leap Motion controller [47], we record in-air fingertip
writings as shown in Figure 3.1. We call the proposed behavioral-biometric-based
CR authentication system as MoCRA. The MoCRA system works as follows. To
authenticate a user, MoCRA randomly prompts a string (e.g., a few words) on the
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Figure 3.1 An illustration of using a Leap Motion controller to acquire a user’s
handwriting in the 3D space for content independent CR authentication.
screen as a challenge, and the user has to write the string in the air as a response.
Then the system performs two steps. First, determine whether the content of the
handwriting is the same as the challenge. Second, verify if the handwriting is created
by the user. Since handwriting recognition can utilize existing technology [48] and
recent study shows that Leap Motion has the potential for handwriting recognition
application [49, 50], this chapter focuses on the second step — user verification based
on the in-air handwriting style , i.e., authenticating based on ‘how you write’ instead
of ‘what you write’.
We choose in-air handwriting style combined with CR mechanism because it
MoCRA has the following advantages. First, it does not require physical contact
to any device. Thus, it eliminates hygiene concerns and is resilient to smudge at-
tacks [51], i.e., finger smudges (due to oily residues) on a touch screen can reveal
passwords. Second, handwriting style is essentially a behavioral biometrics and thus
has limited privacy issue. Third, given the rich combination of letters and num-
bers, the continuously written words are challenging to be synthesized because we
believe that imitating arbitrary handwritings in the three dimensional (3D) space
is ambitious, making it resistant to shoulder surfing. Last but not least, it can be
used as a complementary method when traditional biometrics-based authentication
42
is inapplicable. For instance, fingerprints are inapplicable in several scenarios, e.g.,
fingerprints are unsuitable to users with dirty, greasy, or worn-out fingerprints due to
their professions (e.g., miners).
BuildingMoCRA is promising yet challenging. First, the system has to be content-
independent for CR authentication, because the CR authentication can require a user
to write any content including letters, digits, and special symbols. Second, compared
to writings on tablet, the in-air writings introduce a larger amount of variability
which we believe contain a richer set of biometric yet introduce extra intra-variance
for multiple trial of writings from the same writer. MoCRA has to be reliable despite
the handwriting variation of the same user (especially writing different content) and
possible handwriting similarity between different users (especially writing the same
content). In addition, extracting a handwriting style from 3D movements captured
by Leap Motion is non-trivial because of the overlapped finger trajectories created
when a user is forced to write multiple words within a limited operation range of
Leap Motion (i.e., approximately 25 to 600 mm above the device [52]).
To overcome these challenges and to characterize handwriting styles, we introduce
the concept of stroke segment: a segment of fingertip trajectory that is small enough
to serve as a writing style element. To make the classification computationally rea-
sonable and better represent the writing style, we propose a transition co-occurrence
matrix. We use a sample, i.e., a piece of handwriting (e.g., a trajectory recorded in
5 seconds,) to represent a userâĂŹs handwriting style. By combining co-occurrence
matrices extracted from data samples and an effective classification method — Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM), we are able to authenticate users reliably. For example,
Figure 3.2 illustrates handwriting of two users. Despite that some handwritten words
by User-1 and User-3 appear to be similar (e.g., but) yet some letters written by
the same user may differ (e.g., the highlighted letters ‘o’ and ‘t’), our authentication
system can reliably distinguish them regardless of what they wrote. This is because
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User-1
when comes out other but
User-2
as with makes some even
User-3
when comes out other but
Figure 3.2 Examples of processed trajectories written by two users. Despite that
some handwritten words from User-1 and User-3 appear to be similar (e.g., but) yet
some letters written by the same user may differ (e.g., the highlighted letters ‘o’ and
‘t’), our authentication system can reliably distinguish them regardless of what they
wrote. This is because MoCRA is independent of text contents since it utilizes
features derived at the scale of a stroke segment, e.g., a short length of handwritten
trajectory.
MoCRA is designed to be independent of text contents and utilizes features derived
at the scale of a writing stroke segment. Encouragingly, our system can correctly
identify all the three users, despite the visual similarity between handwritten words
with the same content written by User-1 and User-3. The main contributions of this
chapter are listed below.
• We designed a motion-based challenge-response authentication that we call
MoCRA. MoCRA models handwriting styles in the 3D space and can authenti-
cate users independent on what they write, e.g., English letters, math symbols,
diagrams, or digits.
• We proposed a novel 3-level feature extraction method that derives a co-occurrence
matrix. Thus we reduce the feature dimension, keep temporal information and
statistically represent writing styles.
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• We built a system that uses the latest motion sensor, a Leap Motion controller,
to capture users’ writing movements in the air and performed classification
using SVM.
• We evaluated MoCRA on 24 subjects over 7 months and 7 observing attackers.
The CR authentication results show that the average equal error rate is 1.18%
for random insider attacks and 2.45% for random impostors when testing with
17.5 seconds of handwriting. Besides, we could achieve an average error rate
of 3.11% testing with 8.8 seconds of handwriting. In addition, MoCRA can
reliably reject observing attackers.
We organize the remainder of the chapter as follows. We define the attack model,
discuss the background of Leap Motion and related work in Section 3.2. In Section 4.2,
we discuss the feasibility of authenticating a user using 3D handwriting styles, and
show an overview of the MoCRA system. Then, we present the data processing
in Section 3.4, and feature extraction schemes as well as a classification method
in Section 3.5 and show results in Section 3.6. Finally, we present some discussion
and conclude in Section 3.7.
3.2 Background and Related Work
This chapter aims at designing a biometric-based challenge-response authentication
system that can verify legitimate user(s) and reject attackers. Our system utilizes
a Leap Motion controller, a 3D motion sensor, to track the user’s 3D handwriting,
based on which we verify whether what a user write matches what is asked for. Then
we perform feature extraction and user authentication.
In this section, we define attack models, introduce the Leap Motion controller,




We assume that the system is used in a well controlled environment and attackers
have no physical access to the hardware (i.e., the Leap Motion) nor the software (e.g.,
the operating systems or databases). Second, the communication path between the
Leap Motion and a computer is secure so that no attackers can hijack or inject motion
data in between. Attackers can only attempt to impersonate users by writing in front
of a Leap Motion controller while mimicking other users. we consider the following
two types of attack models.
1)Non-observing attackers try to imitate a legitimate user without any knowl-
edge of the victim’s handwriting style, and hope to be identified as the victim with
random writings. In particular, Non-observing attackers can be either an insider that
has enrolled in the MoCRA system or an impostor without enrollment. Thus, we
consider both non-observing insiders and non-observing impostors.
2) Observing attackers are better informed and they could have visually ob-
served the victim’s writing process, and have viewed finger trajectories of the victim’s
handwriting displayed on a computer screen.
Leap Motion Controllers
Leap Motion is a motion sensor connected to a computer via a USB port, and it can
track the motion of human hands and all ten fingers in the 3D space. Compared to
the Microsoft Kinect, the Leap Motion tracks hands including fingers (e.g., fingertips)
in a much higher precision but in a smaller space. In particular, it can periodically
provide information on finger width, length and motion velocity. Such information
reflects the user’s hand-motion kinematics, from which we can recognize the user’s
handwriting style.
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Leap Motion is equipped with two cameras and three infrared LEDs [53]. The
3D positions of fingers are derived by combining their 2D positions on the image
frames taken by the two cameras and depth measured by the infrared lights. As a
user write in front of a Leap Motion (as shown in Figure 3.1) using one of his finger,
a trajectory of the finger is formed by connecting fingertip positions sequentially and
is displayed on the screen. Leap Motion uses the Cartesian coordinate system and
can track the fingers in a 3D space of an inverted pyramid centered on the device,
and the effective range is approximately 25 to 600 mm above the device (1 inch to 2
feet) [52, 53]. Based on our measurements, it can track the position and velocity of
the human fingertips at a rate of around 114 frames per second and with a spatial
resolution of 0.01mm.
User 1 User 2




























































Figure 3.3 An illustration that characters written by the same user exhibit
similarity while the ones by different users exhibit difference. We use 50 types of
stroke segments (i.e., primitives) that consists of 12 continuous frames for
illustration. The motion trajectories are divided into stroke segments, and the plots
show the primitive-index (y-axis) change over time (x-axis). Plots with similar
profiles represent the similarities of the handwriting style. Stroke segments (denoted
by different colors on the characters) of b and p from the same user (either User 1
or User 2) show similar patterns, i.e., similar sequences of primitive indices, but the




Challenge-response protocols are widely used for user verification over insecure chan-
nels. Randomly generated challenges and encrypted or hashed responses make the
protocols resilient to replay attacks [54] and dictionary attacks [55]. O′Gorman et al.,
without experimental analysis, briefly suggested to create challenge-response proto-
cols with biometrics [56], including speaker verification, keyboard dynamics. Johnson
et al. [57] proposed to use voice to construct a challenge response method that can
verify users without breaching privacy. Their protocol uses encrypted feature vectors
from real users and chaff ones from random people to create a hidden challenge that
can only be recognized by the real users. Our work also uses biometrics, but our
system utilizes motion instead of voice and can work in a noisy environment.
Recently, gestures embedded in the usage patterns of traditional I/O devices (e.g.,
keystroke dynamics [12, 2] and mouse movements, or clicks [11, 58]) and new input
devices (e.g., wearable accelerometer sensors [59], smart phones [1, 60] and multi-
touch screens [61, 62] ) can capture different types of gestures for an authentication
purpose. Our work also try to utilize gestures that are embedded in the usage patterns
of input devices. However, none of the prior work studied the gestures associated with
the emerging depth sensors, nor can they serve as a basis to construct a challenge-
response authentication.
Authentication based on depth sensors has been studied on Microsoft Kinect de-
vices [63, 64] and the Leap Motion controllers [90, 50]. Using motion sensors to
capture in-air handwriting for authentication was first proposed to enhance text-base
passwords [65]. Then, Nigam et al. proposed a recognition system based on fusion
data of signatures from a Leap Motion sensor and face images from a camera [66].
They both combine the writing content with the behavioral biometrics, and thus re-
quires to write the same content for authentication. Our work is different because we
try to harvest the writing style in the 3D-handwriting and do not depend on writing
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content. Thus, our work represents a harder problem and requires to utilize extra
sophisticated features.
Research on handwriting style has been used for identifying the person who wrote
a document or determining whether multiple documents are written by the same
person. Handwritings could be obtained offline (i.e., scanned images of handwrit-
ing [67]), online by a digitizing tablet [33], or in the 3D space [65]. Traditionally,
handwriting styles mostly focus on off-line handwritings and features extraction in-
clude two classes: textural features (e.g., directionally and curvature of patterns
in handwritten images), or allographs extracted from local handwritten patterns
(i.e., shapes [68]). To extract handwriting styles, feature study techniques fall into
two categories: statistical- and codebook- based feature extraction. For statistical
method, Bulacu et al. proposed edge based directional probability distributions as
features [67]. Schomaker et al. proposed joint probability distribution of angle com-
bination of two ‘hinged’ edge fragments [69] and extended by [70]. The codebook-
based features are derived from Bags of (Visual) Words from the computer vision
community [71]. Primitives in the codebook (i.e., vocabulary) are local elements that
extracted from the writing data. Then a histogram of primitives refers from the code-
book as characteristic for a user [72]. Schomaker et al. used the connected-component
contours as the basic elements to capture features of the pen-tip trajectory [73] and
then extended to ink-blob shapes [72]. These methods do not necessary work well on
our problem because our handwriting is dynamic and contains temporal information
(e.g., speed).
On-line handwritings (e.g., handwriting recorded by a tablet) contain temporal
information such as the velocity of the pen movements. For content-dependent ap-
plication, 2D online handwritings are widely used for signature verification [33]. For
content-independent applications, the writing style analysis is applied in writer iden-
tification. Liwicki et al. presented an on-line writer identification system for smart
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meeting rooms, used features at the point (i.e., frame) level and stroke level ex-
tracted from text lines [74]. Namboodiri et al. used low level shape-based features
and Li et al. used stroke level features at probility distribution [75] and then extended
to use temporal sequence codes for speed and pressure changes and shape codes for
direction [76]. These work analyzed handwriting in 2D space and ours focused on 3D,
which we believe introduces additional challenges due to the un-intended issues in the
3D space. In addition, existing writer identification methods used a large amount of
testing text for testing, and are not suitable for authentication where userability is
the key. For instance, [74] used 80 words for a single test and [76] used one paragraph,
about 40 Chinese and/or English characters, for a single test.
Compared to 2D handwriting, 3D handwriting style modeling is challenging, as
trajectories are continuously recorded in 3D space, which results in no obvious stroke
information or pen-up/down moments. In addition, the touch free input method pro-
vides less feedback while writing in-air and thus may result in inconsistency between
trials. MoCRA extracted on extra features to overcome these challenges.
One key step of MoCRA is to check whether the input content of a user is the
same as what the system expected. We call this step as content matching. Sev-
eral literatures can be utilized for the content matching. For instance, MoCRA can
utilize online handwriting recognition that has been studied in pattern recognition
community for a long time, or similarity comparison based on handwriting recogni-
tion. Online handwriting recognition can achieve an accuracy of more than 85% on
pure cursive writings or 95% on others [77, 78, 79, 80], while similarity comparison
can achieve a higher accuracy, since it does not require the specific recognition of
each letter, but a confidence score that shows similarities between two data. Further-
more, recent study [50] achieved a recognition accuracy of 97.59% for in-air English
character recognition, with data from two depth sensors, Kinect and Leap Motion
Controller. These methods could be applied to check the content of what a user
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writes.
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Figure 3.4 (a) Flow chart of MoCRA system. (b) Flow chart of identity matching.
Details of the 3-Level feature extraction are shown in Figure 3.7.
3.3.1 Why does MoCRA work?
The MoCRA system consists of two steps: verifying whether what a user writes
matches what is asked for, and verifies the identity of the user. The first step is not
the focus of this chapter and can be accomplished by utilizing the prior work explained
in Section 3.2.2. In particular, the user writes the content that the system provides
(the Challenge). After receiving the input from the user (the Response), the system
checks if the input content is the same as the system expected. As such, an attacker
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cannot simply ‘replay’ handwriting performed in the past by a legitimate user. Based
on the assumption that the replay attack would not be an issue for MoCRA, we
focus on the second step: how to verify users based on their handwriting styles, i.e.,
based on how they write instead of what they write. The challenges are to correctly
recognize a user even if he/she writes different contents, and to distinguish users
even if they write the same content. The difficulties stem from the possibility of
handwriting variation (especially in writing different contents) of the same user and
occasional handwriting similarity (especially in writing the same content) between
different users. The key to overcome the challenges is to characterize handwriting
styles effectively and efficiently.
Stroke Segments for Effective Modeling. The model characterizing handwriting
styles has to be content-independent. A naive approach could be to extract finger-
tip trajectories that represent each individual character and then to group the ones
of the same characters for further comparison. However, such a method may be
overkill, as the handwriting in the 3D space is difficult to be delimited precisely, as
shown in Figure 3.2. Although content recognition is possible, perfectly delimiting
the fingertip trajectory of each letter is challenging. To avoid the burden of extracting
individual symbols, we choose to characterize handwriting styles by short-length con-
tinuous trajectories, which are analogous to strokes [81, 82]. In practice, it is difficult
to accurately divide a handwriting trajectory into meaningful strokes with variable
lengths. We simply divide fingertip trajectories into a set of short, fixed-length stroke
segments. To reduce the impact of the starting point on a trajectory for stroke seg-
ment partition, we apply a temporal-sliding window over the fingertip trajectory for
constructing stroke segment, and the constructed stroke segments can be partially
overlapped.
Stroke segments can be considered as the basic building blocks that compose
symbols. Although the underlying content in fingertip trajectories may be different,
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some characters may share similar stroke segments. Thus, the two fingertip trajec-
tories created by the same user when writing different sets of words could contain a
large percentage of the similar stroke segments. The stroke segments belonging to
different users typically show little similarity. For instance, as shown in Figure 3.3,
the letters b and p have similar composition. Some stroke segments (denoted by
different colors on the characters) of b and p from the same user show similarity,
but the Stroke segments of User 1 are different from the ones of User 2. Thus, it is
imaginable that the trajectories of the word ‘bob’ and ‘pop’ from the same user
may have many similar stroke segments, but the ones from different users may share
few similar stroke segments.
Vocabulary for Improving Efficiency. We define a frame on a trajectory as a
fingertip position, and consider the associated coordinates and kinematic features at
each frame: frame-level features. To compare the similarity between stroke segments,
we can concatenate the frame-level features of all frames of a stroke segment to
form stroke segment-level features. Then, we can combine all the stroke segment-
level features of a trajectory sample to construct one style-level feature, which is the
unit to represent the handwriting style. However, simply combining all the stroke
segment-level features will lead to high-dimensional vectors. To address this issue, we
can define a stroke segment vocabulary that best represents the collection of stroke
segments of all the enrolled users. The vocabulary consists of a set of primitives
corresponding to typical stroke segments of those users, and each primitive will be
assigned a unique index. The creation of a vocabulary can be conducted during the
training phase. During the testing stage, each stroke segment is assigned the index of
its nearest primitive. This way we reduce each high-dimensional stroke segment-level
features to an integer index.
Finally, to compare the similarity between handwriting styles of multiple sam-
ples, we perform statistical analysis to achieve content-independence. Specifically, we
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obtain statistics on the stroke segment indices within a trajectory sample for con-
structing a low-dimensional feature for a sample. Instead of using the histogram or
probability density functions (PDFs) of the individual stroke segment indices [83,
72, 75], we examine the temporal transition between stroke segments. The intuition
is that a user may tend to write the same sequence of stroke segments, and such
a sequence may be essential to represent handwriting styles. Concretely, we con-
struct a co-occurrence matrix that counts the number of occurrences of each possible
stroke segment (index) transition between temporally adjacent stroke segment pairs.
This co-occurrence matrix reflects the distribution of the temporal stroke segment


















Figure 3.5 An illustration of the outliers in Leap Motion data. The red circles
highlight the frames with outliers.
Continue with the example in Figure 3.3, 50 primitives were derived to form
a vocabulary for illustration. We observe that the similar letter sets (e.g., b and p)
written by the same user contain similar stroke segment indices and transition pattern
of stroke segment indices, while the stroke segment sequences of the same letter (e.g.,
b or p) written by different users share few similarities. This example encourages us
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to study the effectiveness of using vocabulary and transition between stroke segments
to model the handwriting style.
3.3.2 How does MoCRA work?
The MoCRA system consists of a Leap Motion for capturing fingertip movements
in the 3D space, computing and storage units for challenge-response processing and
identity authentication. Figure 3.4(a) shows the flow chart of the challenge-response
authentication.
The MoCRA authentication process consists of two phases: enrollment and test-
ing. During an enrollment, the system will capture the initial handwriting and create
an account for a user. These handwriting inputs will be used for training. In a test-
ing phase, the system first select a random string. After capturing the user’s writing
movements, the system first performs a content check, i.e., verifying whether what a
user writes matches the random string, and then tests the user’s identity. Figure 3.4
illustrates a detailed flow chart of identity matching.
Content Matching. The focus of this chapter is to study the biometrics built in
handwriting motions instead of the content check, because several literatures can
achieve the content check, as shown in Section 3.2.2. Therefore, we do not include
the technique details of this part in the chapter.
Data Processing. Both training and testing phases require data processing and
feature extraction. The goal of data processing is to prepare the raw motion data
captured by Leap Motion and generate a handwriting sample, which consists of a
number of frames that represent the motion of the fingertip. The data processing
will remove outliers and meaningless transition trajectories from the data, as well
as partition the handwriting trajectory into samples, on which the features can be
calculated to represent the writing style.
Feature Extraction. After data processing, a MoCRA system extracts three levels
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of features from each sample: frame-level features, stroke segment-level features, and
style-level features. Level by level, the MoCRA system is able to derive features that
effectively and efficiently model the handwriting styles of users.
SVM Training and Testing. In Figure 3.4, MoCRA system uses the extracted
style-level features for both classifier training and testing. The classifier has to achieve
two goals: correctly authenticate a legitimate user and reject any impostors that are
not part of the pool.
3.4 Data Processing
Data processing constructs samples from raw data recorded by Leap Motion, and
consists of outlier elimination, word segmentation, and sample generation.
3.4.1 Leap Motion Data
Leap Motion captures finger movements in a 3D space (as shown in Figure 3.1):
the left-right motion will be recorded at the x-direction, the up-down motion at
y-direction and the forward-backward motion at the z-direction. As a user raises
his/her hands and uses one of the fingers to write, a Leap Motion controller will
capture information of up to 10 fingers (depending on their visibility). We extract
the data of the foremost fingertip (i.e., the ones with the smallest z-value among all
captured figures), and record a 11-dimensional vector with the information provided
directly by Leap Motion (listed below) at time t as a frame.
1. fingertip position, – (px(t), py(t), pz(t)),
2. fingertip velocity, – (vx(t), vy(t), vz(t)),
3. fingertip direction, – (Dx(t), Dy(t), Dz(t)),
4. finger visible length and width, – Lf (t) and Wf (t).
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In addition, Leap Motion provides an ID number and a timestamp for each frame.
The ID number of each frame for objects (e.g., fingers) is given as a positive number
if at least one object is detected or becomes a negative number if no recognizable
objects are detected. Thus, we utilize the ID numbers to check the validity of a frame
and utilize timestamps to calculate the speed of handwriting. For each round of
recording, Leap Motion will record a collection of frames, by sequentially connecting



























Figure 3.6 An illustration of word segmentation. (a) what was recorded by the
Leap Motion controller, which contains three words and transition trajectories
connecting them. (b) word segmentation results on x-axis. The trajectories starting
from a red square and ending at the next green square are the transition ones,
which are removed to obtain word segments. (c) shows the separated words from




Noises caused by environment variation may affect the Leap Motion raw trajectories.
In general, such noises lead to abrupt changes of the fingertip positions between
adjacent frames, as shown in Figure 3.5. Therefore, they are actually outliers. In
general, we observe two types of outliers: (1) no fingertip is detected (7.32% amount
of data), and (2) a fingertip is detected but at an unlikely position (less than 1%
amount of data). For no-detection cases, we examine the number of consecutive
frames that do not contain detected fingertips. If the number is small, we perform
spatial interpolation. If the number of noisy frames is large, we discard the noisy
frames and divide the raw trajectory into two. Then we can perform the remaining
data processing and feature extraction steps on each trajectory independently. For
unlikely-position cases, we apply a temporal median filter to remove the outliers [84].
At each frame, we examine a temporal window centered at this frame, search for the
median of all values in this window, and set the median as the new value of this
frame. The median filter is applied not only on the x, y and z positions but also
values on other dimensions. For both cases, our algorithm only removes the outliers
and preserves the smoothness and continuity of the handwritings.
3.4.3 Word Segmentation
The main goal of word segmentation is to identify the segments of the handwriting
trajectories that contain useful information for recognizing handwriting styles. When
writing on paper, we proceed from left to right without text overwriting. However,
Leap Motion has limited writing space within which the hand motion can be captured
– after writing one or two words, a finger becomes out of the field of view and it has
to be moved back to the left. As a result, finger trajectories of multiple words are
overlapped and connected with transition trajectories that were traditionally invisible
on paper, as shown in Figure 3.6 (a).
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The transition trajectories shall be removed to extract real words. The key to iden-
tify such transition trajectories is to analyze the variations of x, y and z-coordinates
of the handwriting trajectories (after the noise elimination). As a user writes from
left to right, the x-coordinates increases gradually. In comparison, re-positioning the
hand back to the left bottom corner results in a sudden and large decrease of the
x-value, as shown in Figure 3.6(b), where the x-value periodically decreases since
the user has to move the fingertip back to the left end frequently. Thus, we identify
transition trajectories by searching for a sequence of frames along which the x-value
of fingertip positions monotonically decreases in a short period of time. By remov-
ing transition trajectories (e.g., starting from a red square and ending at the next
green triangle as shown in 3.6(b)), we obtain a set of disjoint word segments shown
in 3.6(c)).
MoCRA sets hotkeys for starting a recording and stopping a recording. Before
starting, finger(s) stay motionless and start writing after the press of the start
hotkey. MoCRA introduces a few data frames before the intent writing and includes
these frames in the first word of a recording. The recording will be ended if any of the
two scenarios happen: the finger(s) are out of the recording area or the stop hotkey
is pressed. Thus, it is possible that extra frames are added to the last word before
the recording ends completely.
3.4.4 Sample Generation
The goal of sample generation is to create a set of samples. Since a single word
may be too short to represent a user’s handwriting style, we construct one sample
with multiple word segments. We denote the total number of frames in a sample
to be the length of the sample. Ideally, the longer the sample length, the better
the verification/identification performance. In practice, the length of samples should
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Figure 3.7 An illustration of constructing a style-level feature, i.e., a co-occurrence
matrix. The rectangular with dash lines represent various levels of features and an
ellipse with solid lines represent ‘vocabulary’.
experiments to understand the trade-off between usability and security, and determine
the appropriate length of samples.
Sample Label s1 s2
# Frames 231 169 231 149 260 144
User 1
Sample Label s1 s2 s3
# Frames 466 288 430 183 512 264
User 2
Figure 3.8 An illustration of constructing samples out of a group of words. The
frame numbers and sample labels of each word segment are listed, and all the word
segments with the same sample label (e.g., s1, s2) constitute a sample. Given each
sample length Ls is no larger than 800 frames, 6 words form different numbers of
samples for Users 1 and 2, due to the different writing speeds.
Since various users may write at different speeds, the number of frames in each
word segment of various users may differ. To avoid the impact of writing speeds,
we construct a sample based on the frame length instead of the number of words.
Figure 3.8 demonstrates an example. In this example, we construct samples with a
60
sample length no greater than 2000 frames. We concatenate as many word segments
as possible into a sample until one extra segment will make the sample contain more
than 2000 frames. With 30 word segments, user 1 can only create less than 4 samples,
and user 2 can create almost 6 samples.
3.5 Feature Extraction and Classification
In this section, we elaborate how to extract features at the frame-, stroke-segment-
, and style-levels, respectively (shown in Figure 3.7). Given a sample, we extract
frame-level features (denoted by f if for the i-th frame) and then combine the features
of Lss consecutive frames to generate a stroke segment-level feature (denoted by f iss
for the i-th stroke segment). After finding the index of the primitive that is closest
to each stroke segment, we obtain a sequence of indices. Then, the occurrences of
stroke segment-transition pairs are counted for creating a style-level feature. Then,
we discuss the SVM classification for verifying users.
3.5.1 Frame-Level Feature
For a frame t, we construct a 19-dimensional feature vector, which comes from eight
types of kinematics features, as summarized in Table 3.1. Out of 19 dimensions, 11
are provided by Leap Motion directly, and 8 are calculated.
1) Position. The 3D fingertip position in the t-th frame is denoted as p(t) =
Table 3.1 Features extracted in the frame level.
Type Features
Positions & Distance p(t), d(t)
Velocity & Acceleration v(t), v̇(t)
Direction D(t)
Finger Size Lf (t), Wf (t)
Slope angle & Path angle θxy(t), θzx(t) and α(t)
Log radius of curvature log 1
κ(t)
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(px(t), py(t), pz(t))T . To make the positions among stroke segments comparable, all the
fingertip positions within a stroke segment are normalized by subtracting the fingertip
position in the first frame of the stroke segment. Thus, the fingertip position in the
first frame of each stroke segment is always (0, 0, 0)T .
2) Position Difference between Frames. The inter-frame position difference
is defined as d(t) = ‖p(t+ 1)− p(t)‖.
3) Velocity. The velocity of the fingertip motion in the t-th frame is provided by
the Leap Motion and we denote it as v(t) = (vx(t), vy(t), vz(t))T .
4) Acceleration. The acceleration of the fingertip motion in the t-th frame is
derived from the velocity, as v̇(t).
5) Direction. The direction of the finger in the t-th frame is provided by the
Leap Motion and we denote it as D(t) = (Dx(t), Dy(t), Dz(t))T .
6) Finger Size. The visible length and width of the finger in the t-th frame
are recorded and provided by Leap Motion and we denote them as Lf (t) and Wf (t),
respectively.









8) Path Angle. Path angle α(t) is the angle between lines p(t)p(t + 1) and
p(t− 1)p(t), as shown in Figure 3.9.
9) Curvature. As show in Figure 3.9, we calculate the log radius of curvature,
log 1
κ(t) , at the t-th frame as one feature, where κ(t) is the curvature:
κ(t) =
√
c2zy(t) + c2xz(t) + c2yx(t)
(ṗ(t)2x + ṗ2y(t) + ṗ2z(t))3/2
,
and
czy(t) = p̈z(t)× ṗy(t)− p̈y(t)× ṗz(t).
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We normalize the feature data in each dimension such that it conforms to a
standard Gaussian distribution in each word. Specifically, we first calculate a mean
value and its standard deviation. Then the values are converted to new values that













Figure 3.9 An illustration of slope angle, path angle and curvature.
3.5.2 Stroke segment-level Feature
As mentioned above, we construct short, partially overlapped, and fixed-length stroke
segments by dividing the word segments of a sample. Let the length of a stroke
segment be Lss, and the length of a word segment be Lw. Define the overlapped
ratio r to be the number of shared frames between a pair of adjacent stroke segments
divided by the stroke segment length Lss. Then the i-th stroke segment starts at




stroke segment for a word segment. Given a sample that consists of n







To combine the frame-level features in a stroke segment into a stroke segment-
level feature, we sequentially concatenate the features extracted from all the frames.
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With 19-dimension feature at frame level, the dimension of this stroke segment-level
feature is 19 ∗ Lss.
Ls = 2, 000 Ls = 4, 000 Ls = 8, 000
U1
U2
Figure 3.10 style-level features (co-occurrence matrix) extracted from samples of
two users. We choose K = 100 for illustration purpose. As the sample length
increases, the shape of co-occurrence matrices remain similar, but the value for each
element (i.e. the occurrences) increases. The results suggest that the matrices can
model handwriting styles.
3.5.3 Style-level Feature
Simply concatenating all stroke segment-level features of a sample together will create
a style feature vector of huge dimensions. For instance, for a sample with n word








To reduce the dimension of style-level features, we first quantize the stroke segment-
level features. We use training samples to learn stroke segment primitives. Specifi-
cally, for each sample, we extract all the stroke segments from all the training samples.
We then use a K-means algorithm to group the stroke segment-level features into K
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clusters. The center of each cluster is considered as a primitive of stroke segment-level
features. With the K clusters, we achieve a vocabulary with K primitives. We index
these K primitives consecutively from 1 to K. With these primitives, we can quan-
tize any stroke segment-level feature, for both the training samples and the testing
samples, by finding its nearest primitive and assigning the stroke segment with the
index of the corresponding primitive.
We then construct the style-level feature by examining the transition of consec-
utive stroke segments. Specifically, for each pair of sequential stroke segments (with
an offset of (1− r)Lss frames in the same word segment), we denote their transition
as an ordered pair < i, j >, where i and j are the primitive indices of these two
stroke segments. Scanning all such stroke segments pairs in a sample, we can build
a K × K co-occurrence matrix, in which the ij-th element indicates the number of
< i, j > stroke segment transitions in this sample. We finally reshape this matrix
into a K2 dimension vector as the feature of this sample. Figure 3.10 shows examples
of the constructed style-level features in the form of the co-occurrence matrix, from
two users’ samples.
3.5.4 Classification
We choose SVM [85] as the classification algorithm, because SVM is relatively ef-
ficient and showed accurate classification results in many real-life systems. SVM
utilizes a “kernal trick” to generalize data well even for high-dimension features. In
our experiments, we choose the (Gaussian) radial basis function (RBF) kernel. We
use grid search method to optimize RBF SVM parameters C and γ [86], and other
parameters are set as default. Finally, we set γ as 0.01 and the penalty parameter C
as 5000.
For challenge-response authentication, the main goal of the classifier is to verify
a user’s identity, thus we train multiple binary-class classifiers for all users. We split
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the input data into two parts: training data and testing data. The training data are
used to model the writing style of a user, and testing samples are used to test a user’s
writing style, thus samples should include writing style representations of the user.
Since the writing styles are extracted from stroke segments instead of letters. Thus,
as long as enough stroke segments are used for training and testing samples, MoCRA
can model a user’s writing style reliably. We assume the content of the challenge has
a fair distribution, so the length of a sample (i.e., how many letters, stroke segments
or frames in a sample) indirectly shows the representations of the writing style. We
will examine appropriate length in Section 3.6.1.
For each user, we take training samples from this user as positive samples and the
other users’ training samples as negative samples and train a binary SVM classifier.
Given a new test sample and the user identity it claims, we test it with the user’s
binary SVM classifier. The sample will be authorized if the classifier returns a positive
response, and be rejected with a negative result. In addition, the classifiers should
reject any impostors, the samples of which are never part of the training data.
3.6 Experiment and Evaluation
We evaluate the performance based on the data collected from 24 subjects, who are
mainly graduate students between 25 to 35-year old. We choose a 19-paragraph,
830-word article from New York Times and then ask each subject to write the whole
article once | in front of a Leap Motion sensor from time to time over a period of 7
months. The word length varies from 1 to 14 characters.
Writing in the air is prone to cause arm fatigue [87]. Since the least physically
demanding position keeps the upper-arm at rest [88], we let the subjects lay their
elbows on a table to rest their upper-arms, and bend their elbows to further reduce
fatigue. The larger the angle between the table and the subjects’ forearms, the less
fatigue they experienced. In addition, we adjusted the position of the Leap Motion
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to make the users’ hand visible. Specifically, we place the Leap Motion sensor facing
up at the right side of the laptop computer, or between the computer monitor and
the keyboard of a desktop computer as shown in Figure 3.1.
We first collect normal data for 24 subjects independently, i.e., each subject writes
the article without observing any other subjects. We use the first few paragraphs for
enrollment and the rest for testing without cross validation. We get 3256 samples in
total, and include 10 words in a sample on average. Among them, 720 samples are
for training, and others are used for testing. Then, we collect data from 7 subjects
who act as observing attackers. In total, 84 attack samples are collected.
Table 3.2 The EER of one victim subject attacked by 23 Non-Observing insiders
with various parameters. The results are averaged with 24 victim subjects. We
varied one parameter at a time and use the following default parameters: one
sample contains no more than 2,000 frames; each experiment uses 30 samples per
subject for training and the rest for testing; each stroke segment contains 12 frames;
each experiment has a vocabulary size of K = 200.
Ls (#Frames) 500 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
wps 2.5 5 10 15 20 25
wt – a sample 4.4s 8.8s 17.5s 26.3s 35.1s 43.9s
wt – Training 2.2min 4.4min 8.7min 13.5min 17.5min 21.9min
EER 6.79% 3.11% 1.18% 1.01% 0.38% 0.32%
# Training Samples 10 20 30 40 50
EER 2.35% 1.63% 1.18% 0.98% 0.91%
Lss (#Frames) 8 12 16 20
EER 2.48% 1.18% 1.34% 1.65%
Vocabulary Size K 50 100 200 400
EER 5.39% 3.54% 1.18% 0.87%
Style-level Feature Histogram Co-occurrence Combined
Matrix Both
EER 5.45% 1.18% 2.01%
3.6.1 Results on CR Authentication
Evaluation Metrics
In the experiment, we verify whether a testing sample is written by a given legitimate
user or not. The output is binary – either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. As discussed in Section 3.5.4,
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we train a binary SVM classifier for each legitimate subject and use samples from
attackers and each legitimate user to test the performance of the system. Given
the binary SVM output, we apply a threshold to determine if the testing sample
belongs to this user. For evaluation, we compute the following metrics to examine
the performance under attacks: (a) tp, the number of true positives, (b) tn, the
number of true negatives, (c) fp, the number of false positives, and (d) fn, the
number of false negatives.
Given that the training data samples can be randomly selected, we can conduct
multiple rounds of experiments and calculate these four metrics at each round. This
















where i = 1, 2, · · · ,m indicates the i-th round of experiments. We plot the standard
ROC curves to quantitatively evaluate the performance of rejecting a skilled attacker.
The ROC curve stands for the receiver operating characteristic curve and is a plot
of the TPR against FPR by varying the threshold of the binary SVM classifiers. The
closer the curve to the top-left corner (0, 1), the better the authentication perfor-
mance. An Equal Error Rate (EER) is the one where the FPR equals to the false
negative rate (FNR). The smaller the EER, the better the performance.
Results for Non-Observing Attackers
Non-observing insiders. To evaluate the performance under non-observing insid-
ers, we utilize data from 24 subjects, train twenty-four classifiers with the training
set and test them with the remaining data. For each classifier, one subject act as the
victim (positive samples) and the rest 23 subjects act as attackers (negative samples).
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Figure 3.11 Performance of all 24 subjects under Non-Observing attacks from
insiders (samples from the rest of 23 subjects) presents by ROC curves. Each
colored curve corresponds to the ROC of one subject.
Note that the data from the 24 subjects that are used for training are not used for
testing.
Results are based on default parameters (one sample contains no more than 2, 000
frames; a training set contains 30 samples per subject, the rests are for testing; each
stroke segment contains 12 frames; the vocabulary size equals to 200). Figure 3.11
shows the results where each ROC curve represents one subject. We observe that for
almost all the subjects, the performance under Non-Observing attacks are close to
ideal, near 100% TPR, 0 FPR. The worst cases are mainly caused by some of their
samples that show similar styles (i.e., represented by similar co-occurrence matrices)
to a few other subjects. We further calculated an average EER of 1.18% among the
24 subjects.
Varying Parameters. We conduct experiments with insider attacks to explore the
effect of different parameters. In each experiment, we change one parameter, and
keep other parameters unchanged. Table 3.2 summarizes the results when varying
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different parameters. The bold numbers are the default parameters we chose.
Length of the sample directly affects the usability of the system – the longer the
sample, the longer time that takes to input a testing sample. As expected, with the
increase of sample length Ls, the accuracy increases. To balance the usability and
performance, we choose Ls = 2, 000, since a sample length of Ls = 3, 000 demands a
user writes 10 more seconds to gain an decrease of 0.17% on error rate.
The number of training samples. Our results show that a larger number of training
samples leads to a better classification results. Conservatively, we choose 30 samples
per subject for training, which maps to a training session less than 10 minutes, and
has an error rate of 1.18%. For a system that can tolerate an error rate of 2.35%, 10
samples are enough for training, which requires a training input session of 3 minutes
for each user. Note that the training input session could be reduced further if a higher
error rate is acceptable.
Stroke segment length Lss. We conduct experiments to find the length of stroke
segments that can represent the coherent features of 3D human handwriting move-
ments. The results in Table 3.2 show that Lss = 12 maps to the best results among
the experiments, thus we choose each stroke segment to be consists of 12 frames. Note
that the overlapped ratio r is set as 2/3 since experiment under this ratio performs
better than other options.
The vocabulary size K indicates how many primitives are selected to represent
the handwriting style. If the number of primitives is too small, then they cannot
capture all the handwriting style. If the number of primitives is too large, then the
size of co-occurrence matrix would be large and induce extra computing overhead. As
expected, the results in Table 3.2 show that a largerK results in a better performance.
Considering the overhead of feature calculation, we choose 200 as the size of the
vocabulary.
Histogram vs. Co-occurrence matrix. We conduct an experiment to justify choos-
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ing transition co-occurrence matrix of stroke segments as the style features. In this
experiment, we directly use the histogram of the each stroke segment features (i.e.,
the histogram of the stroke segment indices), the EER is 6.45%, which is much higher
than 1.18%, which uses co-occurrence matrix. In addition, we combine two features
(both histogram and co-occurrence matrix), but EER (i.e., 2.01%) is not as high as
the ones using only co-occurrence matrix. Therefore, we conclude that the stroke
segment-transition statistics can better represent the handwriting style.
Non-observing impostors. In this scenario, the non-observing impostor is not
part of the group of legitimate users and does not contain any useful information of
the users, thus the impostor’s samples are never a part of the training sets except
for building the vocabulary. To evaluate the performance of MoCRA under non-
observing impostors, we train 23 classifiers for each victim. For each subject as
a victim, si, we repeat the experiment 23 times by rotating the impostor role, sj,
among 23 subjects other than the victim. We label the rest 22 subjects as srest. we
use si’s training data as positive samples, the srest’ training data as negative samples,
while sj’s data are not included. In other word, the twenty-three classifiers for si have
the same positive samples from si, but negative training samples are partly different
as the srest sets are different since different sj is chosen as an impostor. To test
classifiers of si, we label all data from the attacker sj as negative samples, and the
testing data from the victim si are positive samples. The result of each curve shown
in Figure 3.12 is the averaged testing results on the 23 classifiers. The overall EER
is 2.45% on average for all 24 subjects.
Results for Observing Attacks
We use observing attacks to emulate the extreme case where an attacker happens to
observe a user’ writing process and the system ask the attacker to respond to the same
challenge as the victim has done in the past, although it is unlikely for the system
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Figure 3.12 Performance of all 24 subjects rejecting impostors presents by ROC
curves. Each colored curve corresponds to the ROC of one subject.
to select the same challenge in practice. In this experiment, out of the 24 subjects,
we randomly select 4 as victims, and invite 7 subjects act as attackers (none of the 7
subjects overlaps with the 24 subjects). Against each victim, each attacker writes a
selected paragraph of the article three times. Before each new attempt, the attackers
spend time to 1) observe the victims’ writing processes by watching their videos up
to three times, and 2) view the finger tracking results of the victims’ handwriting on
the computer screen. This way, we collected 4× 7× 3 = 84 writings as the observing
attack data.
In the observing attacks, we use the same binary classifiers of the 4 victims trained
in the non-observing attack scenarios. This way, none of the observing attack data
are included for training. We then use the victims’ untrained normal data and the
collected observing attack data for evaluation. Figure 3.13 shows the verification
performance of these 4 victim subjects against the observing attacks. Our results
show that the observing attackers cannot achieve a much better verification result
than a non-observing attacker who has no information about the victim. In particular,
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the averaged EER of non-observing insider attacks is 1.16% for the 4 victims, which
is similar to the average on of 24 subjects under insider attacks. The averaged EER
of observing attacks is 3.11% for these 4 victims. Thus, learning the writing content
and watching the writing process do not necessary always improve the impersonate
attacks greatly and may have limited help in impersonating users in MoCRA.
3.7 Chapter Discussion and Summary
3.7.1 Discussion
Content Matching. In this chapter we focused on how to apply the in-air handwriting
style for authentication. For security concerns, we introduced challenge-response
procedure. We believe that the matching between the challenge and the response
























































































Figure 3.13 Authentication performance of the victims under observing attacks
presents by ROC curves.
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(i.e., handwriting content matching) can utilize approaches designed for handwriting
recognition. Much work has been proposed to recognize content from off-line writings,
on-line writings (2D), and in-air writings (3D). These content matching approaches
can be added to fulfill the proposed method. Essentially, the implemented MoCRA
in the chapter authenticates based on ‘how a user writes’ instead of both ‘how a
user writes’ and ‘what a user writes’. As a direction for future work, it is important
to investigate content matching and its impact on the accuracy of the system. We
suspect that content matching could improve the security, since our evaluation results
do not reject the attack samples that have the same hand writing style distribution
as the legitimate one but extracted from different content, such cases should be
rejected at the earlier stage – content matching. In addition, as a direction of future
work, it is worth performing usability studies to understand the trade-off between
security benefits and extra effort imposed by the introducing of the challenge-response
mechanism.
Handwriting Segmentation. We used a fix number of continuous sampling frames to
represent the primitives of handwriting. However, based on the trajectories’ inner
variations, one can extract segments according to a few features (e.g., curvature,
direction, speed) so that each segment will contain unique style information of a
user, while the length of each segment is not necessarily the same. Thus, it is worth
exploring new segmentation methods for enhancing writing style modeling as a task
of future work.
Vocabulary Generation. We extracted a vocabulary based on the training data prior
to classifier training. Ideally, a pre-trained vocabulary with a separate database can
avoid new vocabulary training whenever a new user enrolls. For scenarios of a large
group of users, the pre-training on the vocabulary in a separate database can im-
prove the computation performance at the training stage. However, our experiments
involved 24 subjects on campus, and is not large enough to generate a representative
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vocabulary for various writing styles while maintaining a statistically significant re-
sults of authentication evaluation. We note that this limitation can be eliminated by
extra data collection.
3.7.2 Summary
We design a motion-based challenge response authentication scheme that is based on
a user’s handwriting style in a 3D space, and we leverage a hand motion sensor —
Leap Motion controllers — to capture finger movements as a user writes in the air.
Our scheme authenticates users based on ‘what they write’ and ‘how they write’. We
focus on ‘how they write’ in this chapter, and ‘what they write’ will be discussed in
the future work. Our results show that the co-occurrence matrix that built on sets
of stroke segments (i.e., a small, fixed-length trajectory of fingertip movements) can
model a user’s handwriting style. We envision that our authentication scheme can
be used in applications such as building security guard authentication.
We built a system called the MoCRA and evaluated it on 24 subjects for 7 months.
Our results show that MoCRA can reliably authenticate one of the 24 subjects with
an average equal error rate of 1.18% and reject impostors with an error rate of 2.45%.
In addition, MoCRA can effectively reject skilled attackers that observed victims’




With the emerging of touch-less human-computer interaction techniques and gadgets,
mid-air hand gestures have been widely used for authentication. Compared with the
traditional authentication methods, authentication via mid-air hand gestures which
has the advantages of improved sanitation and natural human-computer interaction.
Much literature examined either the usability or security of a handful of gestures.
In this chapter, we aims at quantifying usability and security of gestures as well as
understanding their relationship across multiple gestures.
4.1 Introduction
The proliferation of various gesture capturing devices (e.g., touch screen and depth
sensors) has enabled user-friendly ways to operate computers as well as to authen-
ticate users. Essentially, such gesture-based authentication is behavioral biometrics.
Compared with traditional methods (e.g., passwords, tokens, or physiological bio-
metrics), gesture-based authentication has several advantages and is believed to be
resistance to shoulder surfing, password thieves, or token loss. Not surprisingly,
much work has been devoted into gesture-based authentication, and researchers have
studied both contact-based and mid-air gestures. The contact-based gestures are
harvested while users touch I/O devices physically. In comparison, mid-air gestures
require no physical contact of devices, and thus can eliminate smudge attacks [51],
avoid bacteria propagation, and allow scenarios where touch is impossible (e.g., in
a clean room [89]). In light of these advantages, in this chapter, we investigate the
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Figure 4.1 Illustration of using various gestures as authentication inputs. Left
picture shows waving with multiple fingers and right picture shows writing a You
with one finger.
security and usability of mid-air gestures.
Already, researchers have proposed and studied various mid-air gestures for au-
thentication, which, to name a few, include signature gestures captured by a Leap
Motion controller [66], two ‘upward’ hand movements [90], simple gestures, such as
drawing shapes, symbols, digits, etc., captured by a web camera with a short range
depth sensor [91]. These works provide insights towards designing gestures for au-
thentication. However, they either focused only on the security of mid-air gestures
or performed preliminary user study on a limited number of gestures over a short
period.
It is so far unclear, does a complicated gesture always map to a higher level of
security? Will a complicated gesture encompass larger variance and cause inconsis-
tency in identifying a user? Does a complicated gesture represent poor usability,
e.g., it takes long time to perform and is difficult to remember? Does gesture-based
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authentication share the same dilemma of passwords: what is secure is difficult to
remember? Given a gesture, can we provide quick feedback on its security level and
thus assist in choosing a better gesture? This chapter aims at answering these ques-
tions. In particular, we first selected a collection of representative mid-air gestures
and user-defined gestures with the goal of exploring the trade-off between usability
and security. We quantify security and usability of each gesture by using both ob-
jective metrics that are calculated based on gesture samples and subjective metrics
derived from a survey. Using the gesture samples collected by 42 users over 6 weeks
and the survey responded by 103 participants, we managed to show that the quan-
titative metrics match with subjective perception of users and thus can be used to
quantify the security and usability of gestures. Since we discovered that the usabil-
ity and security are in inverse relationship, we can use the quantitative metrics of
usability, i.e., the number of corners and the length of a gesture, to quantify the
security of the gestures and provide quick feedback of a gesture. We summarize our
contributions as below.
• We proposed a set of metrics to quantify the usability and security of a gesture,
which include objective metrics that are calculated based on gesture samples
and subjective metrics derived from a survey.
• We proposed an authentication method that combines a template-based method
(DTW) and a machine-learning based classifier (SVM). The combined method
can handle large spatial-temporal variations of a gesture by using a small num-
ber of training samples.
• We conducted two studies to quantify the gesture’s security and usability: an
objective evaluation by authenticating gesture samples collected over 6 weeks
and a subjective evaluation by gathering well-designed questionnaires from
users.
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• Our studies indicate that usability and security are in inverse relationship and
thus we can utilize simple metrics (the number of corners and frames) to quan-
tify the security of a gesture for quick feedback. In addition, our study suggests
that repeated performing a gesture can improve users’ perception of usability
and help improve the consistency of gestures.
• Our study on shoulder surfing shows that hand gestures are hard to mimic and
shoulder surfing attack is not a main thread to our authentication system.
4.2 Overview
In this section, we overview our problem definition and define metrics to quantify
security, usability, as well as consistency.
4.2.1 Problem
Numerous gestures have been proposed to authenticate users, yet little has been done
to compare their performance in terms of security and usability. This chapter aims
at filling in the blank by quantifying the security and usability of different mid-air
gestures. We quantify security and usability of each gesture by using both objective
metrics that are calculated based on gesture samples and subjective metrics derived
from a survey. In particular, this chapter tries to answer the following questions.
• Security question: Given a set of gestures, which gesture maps to the best
security level, i.e., it yields the best accuracy of authentication?
• Usability question: Given a set of gestures, which one is the easiest to use and
the most acceptable to users? How to quantify the usability purely using the
statistics of gestures?
• Security vs. Usability: What is the relationship between security and usability
when using mid-air gestures for authentication? Does gesture-based authenti-
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cation share the same dilemma of passwords: secure gestures are more difficult
to be remembered?
4.2.2 Security
In the context of gesture-based authentication, we define security from the aspects of
distinctness and resilience to attacks — i.e., shoulder surfing attack. A secure gesture
should contain distinct biometric information that suffices user authentication, i.e.,
even if two users perform the same gestures, their gesture samples should be distin-
guishable. In addition, a secure gesture should be resilient to attacks. Since much
work claims that mid-air gestures are robust against should surfing attacks without
validation, we focus on such attack.
Metrics. Since the accuracy of gesture-based authentication typically depends on
the feature selection and machine-learning based classification algorithms, we quantify
distinctness by the authentication performance. In particular, we use Equal Error
Rate (EER), which is the value where the false rejection rate equals to the false
acceptance rate. Distinctness is quantified by the EER using the gesture samples
obtained within a day. In addition, we obtain users’ subjective perception of security
by conducting a user survey. Details are discussed in Section 4.5.1.
We use precision and recall to analyze the performance of each gesture password
for defending against shoulder surfing attack. Precision is the percentage of honest
users out of all the users that have passed verification, and it describes how cautious
the system is to accept a user. A perfect secure system should have a precision of







Recall is the percentage of the honest users that have been granted access out of all
honest users, and it affects the user experience. A recall of 100% indicates that an
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Motivated by the standard ISO 9241-11 [92], we define the usability of a gesture
by considering its efficiency, ease of use, satisfaction, and learnability. Efficiency
describes the resources required from users for successful authentication. Satisfaction
reflects the comfort and acceptability of using the gesture, and learnability is defined
by the “time of learning”, i.e., how easy is it for users to pass the gesture-based
authentication at their first attempt [93]?
Metrics. To objectively quantify the efficiency and satisfaction of a gesture,
we calculate the average length of the gesture samples (i.e., how long does a user
perform the gesture) and the average number of corners in the gesture samples (i.e.,
the number of sharp turning points in the gesture). Intuitively, the longer it takes to
perform a gesture or the more corners in a gesture, the less convenient the user feels
and the poorer the usability. In addition, usability is subject to how users perceive.
Thus, we also conducted a comprehensive user survey on the usability of each gesture.
Details are discussed in Section 4.5.2.
4.2.4 Consistency
Consistency (aka. memorability) can affect both security and usability, and thus we
study consistency by itself. An ideal gesture should be consistent over time with little
memorization requirements: when users return for authentication after a period of
time since the last try, they can still provide gestures that contain the same biometric
information as the ones that were initially enrolled for authenticating them. The more
consistency, the better security performance and the less effort to pass authentication.
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Metrics. We quantified consistency from three aspects: (a) the survey responses
(b) the variances of each gesture over time (i.e., the frame number and corner number
) (c) the EER of the gesture samples over a period of time (in our case, 6 weeks) .
4.3 System Design
We design an authentication system based on a Leap Motion controller, which is a
3D motion sensor and can track the motion of human hands as well as all ten fingers
in the 3D space. We define a gesture sample as one measurement that contains a
complete gesture, i.e., N frames reported by Leap Motion. On each frame, Leap
Motion captures raw data consisting of 20 features of a hand and 11 features of each
finger. We develop a program written in Java that integrated Leap Motion’s SDK
2.0v [94] for collecting gestures. After collecting the gesture data, we build a classifier
which combines two algorithms (DTW and SVM) to distinguish users.
In this section, we introduce the candidate gestures, feature selection and the
classifier of our authentication systems.
4.3.1 Authentication Algorithms
Similar to most biometrics based authentication systems, we utilize supervised clas-
sifiers that requires training to distinguish users. An ideal classifier should only
require a small number of training samples, and always accept valid users and reject
attackers. To effectively authenticate a user based on their mid-air gestures, in this
chapter we design an authentication algorithm that combines Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW) [61] and Support Vector Machine (SVM) [85] methods. As a template-based
method, DTW is widely used to quantify similarity between samples and only requires
a small number of templates. It allows nonrigid warping along the temporal axis and
thus can tolerate differences in timing between gestures, i.e., a user may perform the
same gestures at slower or faster speeds among trials. SVM is a popular machine
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learning algorithm that can handle more complex spatial-temporal variations of the
same gestures at the cost of a large number of training samples. By combining the
DTW and SVM methods, the proposed method can handle large spatial-temporal
variations of a gesture by using a small number of training samples.
SVM. Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a classification technique of obtaining
the optimal boundary to separate two classes. The goal is to build a hyperplane with
the maximum margin, i.e. we want to find a boundary such that has the largest
distance between it and the closest data points from both sets.
To find an optimal boundary, we transform the original attribute vector x to a
higher dimensional space. Let Φ be the transformation. The boundary is written as
w ·Φ(x) + b = 0.
To calculate the parameters w and b, we introduce the kernel function K(x,x′) =
Φ(x) ·Φ(x′) which indicates the distance of two instances in the higher dimensional
space. Based on the method of Lagrange multiplier, the optimal boundary for
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In this chapter, we choose the (Gaussian) radial basis function kernel (RBF) to
build an SVM classifer. An RBF kernel is a popular choice and yields a satisfied
accuracy on our data. It is defined by
K(x,x′) = exp(−||x− x
′||2
2σ2 ).
DTW. Dynamic time warping (DTW) is a well-known technique to solve time
series problems in a variety of domains. It aims at finding an optimal alignment
between two given sequences by minimizing their distance.
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Assume we have two time dependent sequences U := (u1, u2, . . . , uM) of length
M and V := (v1, v2, . . . , vN) of length N , where um and vn are sampled points in the
corresponding sequences. To compare these two points, we define a function d(u, v)
to calculate the distance between two points u, v. By calculating the distance for each
pair of points of these two sequences, we obtain a m-by-n matrix where the element
in the mth row and nth column is d(um, vn). To find the best alignment between U
and V , we retrieve a path through the matrix that has the minimum overall distance
among all possible paths. Define the DTW distance between these two sequences to
be the total distance of the optimal warping path, which can be formalized as




where umk and vnk are the kth index of the two points. The optimal path can be
determined by dynamic programming.
SVM Training and Classification. We train a binary SVM classifier for each
user with T template samples. Specifically, given a system with M users, to train
the SVM classifier for user i, we take its T template samples as the positive training
samples and the template samples from other users as the negative training samples,
i.e., (M − 1)T samples. For each training sample, we extract its W -dimensional
DTW-based feature as the input to the SVM classifier, where W = MT . With the
trainedM SVM classifiers, we can verify whether a new gesture sample gtest is indeed
performed by a user u by (a) computing the DTW distance between gtest and all
W template samples to obtain the W -dimensional feature of the sample gtest, and
(b) input this W -dimensional DTW-based feature to the user u’s SVM classifier.
If the output of the SVM classifier is positive, the authentication of the user u is
succeeded. Otherwise, the authentication is failed.
To enroll a new user, we collect his/her T template samples, add to the existing
template samples, and retrain the SVM classifiers for all the users. In particular,
the dimension of the sample feature will increase by T when a new user is enrolled,
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i.e., W = (M + 1)T . Note that it is possible that users may have various feature
dimension of their SVM classifiers, depending on the sequence of their enrollment.
4.3.2 Feature Selection
Based on our authentication algorithms, we extract two levels of features for DTW
and SVM, respectively: frame features and DTW-based features. Specifically, given
a gesture sample, we first obtain frame features for each frame, and then calculate
DTW-based feature by computing the sample’s DTW distance to all the template
samples (provided by users in the enrollment stage), shown as in Table 4.1. Using
this DTW-based feature as the input, we train a binary SVM classifier for each user
independently. Finally, in the verification stage, given a new gesture sample, we
calculate its DTW-based feature, using which the trained SVM classifier verifies it.
Frame Features. A raw data frame of Leap Motion contains N frames with
each frame containing 20 features for a hand and 11 features for each finger. Frame
features consist of features directly from the raw data and the derived ones. The hand
features include the following: grab strength and pinch strength, which describe the
posture of the hand; pitch, yaw, and roll, which describe the angles of the hand
around the x−, y−, and z-axes; palm width; (x, y, z) coordinates of palm, arm, and
wrist, respectively; hand type, which indicates whether it is a left or right hand; 4
flags of gesture types, i.e., whether it is a circle, a swipe, a key tap, or a screen tap.
The finger features include the (x, y, z) coordinates, the 3 dimensional velocity, and
the moving directions of each finger tip, finger length, and finger width. Combing
the features of the hand and its five fingers, we obtain 75 features on each frame
from the raw data. In addition to these 75 features, on each frame we generate five
new features based on finger features: the distance between finger tip positions in
consecutive frames, two angles of finger-tip positions between consecutive frames in
x− y plane and x− z planes, one angle in the 3D plane, and one curvature in the 3D
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Table 4.1 Frame features from Leap Motion and DTW-based gesture-sample
features.
Frame-based Hand:
feature grab strength, and pinch strength,
for DTW pitch, yaw, and roll,
palm width, and x, y, z axis of palm
x, y, z axis of arm and wrist.
Finger:
x, y and z positions of finger-tips,
x, y and z velocities of finger-tips,
x, y and z directions of finger-tips,
angles between consecutive frames.
DTW-based DTW distance to W template samples
feature sample g′s DTW distance to W template samples
for SVM {g11, g12, · · · , g1T , g21, g22, · · · , g2T , · · · , gM1,
gM2, · · · , gMT}
plane [94]. This way, we have 25 new features over five fingers and in total we obtain
100 features on each frame.
DTW-Based Features. In the enrollment stage, we collect T gesture samples for
each of theM enrolled anchor users. This way, we in total haveW = T×M template
samples gij, where i indicates user i and j indicates the ith template samples from each
user. Given a gesture sample g, we extract aW -dimensional sample feature vector by
computing and concatenating its DTW distances against all theW template samples,
by following a fixed order of {g11, g12, · · · , g1T , g21, g22, · · · , g2T , · · · , gM1, gM2, · · · , gMT}.
This W -dimensional sample feature is then used as the input to train and test the
SVM classifiers.
Feature Reduction. Since the 100 features of each frame do not contribute
equally towards verification, we select a subset of them to compute the DTW distance
with the goal of maximizing the verification performance. To evaluate each feature, we
use each of these 100 frame features to compute the DTW-based feature as mentioned
above for training the SVM classifier and evaluating the average EER over all the
users (to be discussed later). We discard the frame features that produce an EER less
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than 50%. Eventually, we kept 75 frame features. To further boost the verification
performance, we calculate the weight for each frame feature and use feature weights
for computing the DTW distance between gesture samples.
4.3.3 Gesture Selection
Many types of gestures have been studied in prior work, either in the context of gesture
recognition or user authentication. These gestures include but not limited to swipe,
zoom in/out, pan and scroll, point, and rotate either on touch screens or in the air [95,
61, 96]; triangle, cancel, rectangle, and circle [97]; slide, pinch, and handwriting [96];
mid-air wave [98], mid-air signatures [65], etc. Covering every possible type of gestures
is difficult, and thus we select a few popular gestures that are used for operating
computing system and controlling home appliances (e.g., smart TVs) and/or have
been studied specific for authentication, i.e., Swipe, Wave, Zoom and Grab and choose
drawing gesture Circle, writing gesture ‘abc’ and user-defined signatures (Sig) as
they are studied for authentication purpose. Finally, we let each user define a gesture
to reflect his/her preferences that are not included in the aforementioned gestures,
we call it User-defined gesture.
In total, we select six pre-defined gestures and two user-defined gestures. We
illustrate all gestures in Figure 4.2 and show gesture samples captured by Leap Motion
in Figure 4.3.
Pre-Defined Gestures
1) Swipe. Users intentionally swipe his or her hand from one position to another
position, and we define Swipe as a one way movement. Nowadays, swiping touch
screens is a popular way to turn pages.
2) Wave. Users naturally wave their hand. We choose this gesture because we be-
lieve it is easy to perform and might lead to promising usability. Figure 4.2 illustrates




Grab ‘abc’ User-defined Sig
Figure 4.2 Illustration of the selected gestures. The five colors corresponds to the
trajectories from five fingers, respectively.
and forth between left and right (i.e., waving hands to represent Hello or goodbye).
3) Zoom. Gestures Zoom in or out require to engage at least two fingers: Zoom either
gathers finger-tips toward palm center or spreads out the finger-tips. Both gestures
are commonly used for touch screen for changing the font size, showing/hiding a
window, etc. We study Zoom in the context of 3D space.
4) Circle. Gesture Circle maps to the hand movement of drawing a circle when
all five fingers are stretched out and towards the computer screen. The movement can
be preformed clockwise or counter clockwise, and consists of one circle or multiple
circles.
5) Grab. Gesture Grab is a quick, sudden clutch, starting with all fingers spread
and ending at a fist.
6) ‘abc’. Gesture ‘abc’ is the hand movement of writing a string ‘abc’ with five
fingers. It is chosen to test the gestures of writing letters/word.
User-Defined Gestures
1) Sig. We let users sign their initials/first/full names that might be used for
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Swipe Wave Circle Zoom
Grab ‘abc’ User-defined Sig
Figure 4.3 The examples of gestures in x-y plane. The five colors correspond to
the trajectories from five fingers.
signing documents. Some of our participants used all five fingers to sign and some of
them used only one finger.
2) User-defined. We let each user to freely make one gesture that he/she believes
to be secure and convenient for him/her. As shown in Figure 4.3, many users select
to draw triangle as their user-defined multi-finger gesture.
4.4 Data Acquisition
We conducted two studies to quantify the gesture’s security and usability by recruiting
two groups of users: (1) the G-Sample+ group with 42 participants who visited our
lab in-person and (2) the G-MTurk group with 61 workers from Amazon MTurk.
4.4.1 Field Study
In this study, we recruit 42 participants in theG-Sample+ group from two universities.
They were asked to complete gesture collection in the lab over 6 weeks and finish a
survey in the end.
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Table 4.2 Demographics and security preferences of the study participants.
G-Sample+ G-MTurk
n = 42 n = 61
Gender 23.8% 47.5% Female
76.2% 52.5% Male
Age 40.5% 3.3% 18 – 24
54.7% 39.3% 25 – 34
2.4% 27.9% 35 – 44
2.4% 14.8% 45 – 54
0% 14.7% 55 years or older
Education 0% 1.6% No schooling completed
2.4% 18.0% High school
45.2% 60.7% College degree / Bachelor
52.4% 19.6% Master / PhD Equivalent
Occupation 92.8% 3.3% Student
4.8% 88.6% Employed
2.4% 8.2% Unemployed/retired
Current 2.4% 1.6% None
preferred 78.6% 73.8% Digital PIN
method 73.8% 82.0% Alphanumeric password
21.4% 4.9% Token card
59.5% 41.5% Fingerprints
2.4% 11.5% Face recognition
9.5% 6.6% Graph / Android Pattern
0% 3.3% Other
Participant
Table 4.2 summarizes the demographics of the participants in the G-Sample+ group,
which consists of 32 males and 10 females. Among the 42 participants, 40 people are
between 18 and 34 years, majority of whom are college students, and 2 participants
are between 35 and 54 years. In addition, responses to the current preferred authenti-
cation methods showed that they mostly prefer digital pin, alphanumeric passwords,
and fingerprints.
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Table 4.3 Basic information on data collection.
Data #Participants #Samples Ave. days after
Batch No. excpet UD only 1st collection
1st 32 3400 0
2nd 32 2724 2
3rd 32 2567 5
4th 32 2519 8
5th 31 2352 10
6th 29 1904 12
7th 28 1732 15
8th 28 1693 17
9th 27 1490 24
10th 24 1297 27
11th 14 954 32
12th 13 885 37
13th 13 874 43
Data Collection
The 42 participants in the G-Sample+ group completed gesture collection in the lab
over 6 weeks. Table 4.3 summarizes the information for each round of data collection.
Each batch denotes that we collect the participants’ gesture data for one time. In
the first two weeks, the participants came to our lab three times per week and in
the third and forth weeks, twice per week. For the last two weeks, the participants
came to our lab three times in total. The time elapsed between two consecutive data
collections are more than 24 hours. In total, we collected 13 batches of data around
6 weeks.
Among the 42 participants, 32 participants perform all types of gestures. To mimic
the real scenarios where a user may only need to remember a few User-defined
gestures, the other 10 users in this group only contribute to User-defined gestures.
When participants perform gestures, we encouraged them to perform in the most
comfortable ways. Each participant was compensated a $20 gift card after completion
the whole experiment.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 4.4 Gesture Wave performed by 4 different users, and each color represents
a trajectory one finger. Samples (a) to (d) are similar, while samples (e) and (h)
show other possibilities of gestures Wave.
Pre-defined Gestures. Most of the pre-defined gestures are commonly used on
touch screens or pad, and users usually know how to perform them. Nevertheless,
users have their own preferences of performing gestures. For instance, a user may
wave from left to right, and another user may wave from top to down. Figure 4.4
shows the traces of how eight users wave. We analyze users’ gestures and report the
following statistics.
User-defined Gestures.
1) Gesture User-defined. Participants were encouraged to select one gesture
that is secure for authentication and convenient to use. Among the 42 participants,
25 chose letter(s) and number(s). 17 participants chose to draw simple shapes, such
as mathematical symbols, stars, and the combination of the above shapes or some
other strange shapes.
2) Gesture Sig. For convenience concerns, most participants did not sign their
whole name, but just their initials, first names, or family names. Among all of them,
initials are the most popular choices, which account for 70%. The average length
(i.e., the number of English letters) of the collected signatures is 4.4 with a maximum
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of 8 and minimum of 1.
Survey. After finishing the gesture collection over six weeks, the participants were
asked to answer a survey. The survey consists of four parts: (1) Part one asked for
participants’ background information, e.g., gender and age and their preferences on
authentication mechanisms. (2) Part two includes 10 standard System Usability Scale
(SUS) [99] questions to collect the participants’ attitudes towards the authentication
system. In particular, 8 out of 10 questions are related to the system’s usability,
and the other 2 questions are related to the learnability. (3) The third part of the
survey consists of a set of 15 questions. We modified 10 SUS questions to measure the
usability of each gesture, and added 5 more questions to measure user’s memorability,
security, and satisfactory level. (4) In the end, we asked participants to rate the
security level of each gesture if they are going to use these gestures as passwords.
Finally, we collected 42 responses to part one of the survey. We also collected 36
responses to part two and three. There are 6 participants who didn’t respond to the
last two parts of the survey.
4.4.2 Online Study
Since most participants in the G-Sample+ group are college students, which may
introduce bias. To confirm the result from the G-Sample+ group, we conducted a
supplementary study online through Amazon MTurk. Participants in this study
were only asked to answer the survey after watching a brief introduction to the
authentication system and the gesture set.
Participant
We recruited 61 participants in the G-MTurk group through Amazon MTurk. Ta-
ble 4.2 summarizes the demographics of the participants in the G-MTurk group,
which shows a balanced distribution in gender and a normal distribution in age. The
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Table 4.4 Questions for each gesture in the survey.
Question
1 I would like to use this gesture frequently.
2 I found it unnecessarily complex.
3 I thought it was easy to use.
4 I would need training to be able to use it.
5 I found it would be performed smoothly.
6 I think I cannot perform the same gesture every time.
7 I would imagine that most people would learn to use it very quickly.
8 I found it very cumbersome to use.
9 I felt very confident using it.
10 I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this
gesture.
11 I can easily remember how to perform this gesture.
12 It is hard for me to recall this gesture after one week.
13 The gesture is guessable by others.
14 It’s impossible for others to perform the gesture exactly the same way
I perform it.
15 It is pleasant to use this gesture.
majority of participants have a bachelor’s degree. Similar to the G-Sample+ group,
responses to the current preferred authentication methods showed that they prefer
digital pin, alphanumeric passwords, and fingerprints.
Data Collection
This group was introduced to the gesture-based authentication slightly differently
from the G-Sample+ group. Before conducting the survey, each worker in the G-
MTurk group has to watch a 71-second long video that demonstrates the procedure
of gesture-based authentication and pre-defined gestures one by one. Participants
in this group finished all survey questions except one for the gesture User-defined.
Participants who finished our survey were paid $1.5.
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Table 4.5 Participants’ responses to the acceptance to authentication system using
mid-air gestures. (A) responses to “If it is available, I would like to use the mid-air
gesture password to unlock (choose all that apply):”. (B) responses to “How many
times would you willing to use the mid-air gesture password in a week?”.
G-Sample+ G-MTurk
n = 42 n = 61
88.1% 70.5% Know depth sensors
90.5% 65.5% Accept mid-air gesture
for game/computer operation
68.9% 85.7% Accept mid-air gesture
for authentication
(A) 2.4% 29.5% None
52.4% 36.1% Phones/pads
64.3% 54.1% Computers/laptops/devices
33.3% 36.1% Physical doors
7.1% 8.2% Bank accounts
7.1% 16.4% Online accounts
19.0% 23.0% Social network accounts
(B) 31.1% 14.3% 0
21.3% 16.7% 1 to 5
14.8% 38.1% 6 to 10
13.1% 9.5% 10 to 20
19.7% 21.4% more than 20
4.5 Evaluation
We objectively evaluated the security and usability of all the gestures by analyzing the
collected samples, e.g., computing the number of corners, the number of frames, and
the EER of each gesture. We also subjectively evaluated the security and usability
of all the gestures by conducting a survey from all the users. Details are discussed
in Section 4.4. In the end, we try to explore the relationship between usability and
security from both objective and subjective perspectives.
4.5.1 Security Evaluation
We discuss distinctness in this section and consistency in Section 4.6 and shoulder
surfing attack in Section 4.7. In this section, we first summarize the subjective security
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Figure 4.5 The security performance evaluated by survey responses from all
participants and the EER from the authentication system.
results reported by participants and then quantify security objectively by EER.
Results from Survey Responses
The forth part of the survey includes a set of questions to evaluate each gesture’s
security level if it is used as a password, and the question uses a 5-point Likert
scale “Least secure” - “Most secure”. In Figure 4.5, the pink bars show the score of
security estimation derived from the survey responses. We first count the percentage
of participants who chose “Second secure” and “Most secure”. Then we divided the
percentage values (< 100) by 20 to fit the scale of EER (< 6%), which are shown in
sky blue bars.
We conducted an ANOVA test to see if there were significant differences of security
levels for the first seven gestures (excluding the User-defined gesture, as it may also
contain ones similar to Swipe, Wave or else). The test result shows that there was a
significant difference between some gestures on the perceived security at the p < 0.01
level [F (6, 175) = 13.05, p = 3.53e − 12]. Post hoc comparisons indicated that the
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security level for Sig was significantly different from Swipe, Wave, Circle, Grab, Zoom.
Also, the security level for ‘abc’ was significantly different from Swipe, Wave, Circle.
The results suggest that Sig and ‘abc’ have relatively higher security level than other
gestures for participants . From Figure 4.5, we have similar observations: (a) Pre-
defined simple gestures Wave, Swipe, Grab, Zoom, and Circle are considered insecure.
(b) Gesture ‘abc’ is considered to have the medium security level. (c) Gesture Sig
is considered the most secure authentication gesture.
Results from Equal Error Rate
A smaller EER maps to a higher verification performance. Given an authentication
system that should grant access to legitimate users and reject attackers, FAR (false
acceptance rate) and FRR (false rejection rate) can be defined as:
FAR = #of accepted attackers#of attackers
FRR = #of rejected legitimate users#of legitimate users
Experiment Setup. To verify the overall performance of the system, we tested all
the data with five folds of experiments. For each gesture type and each user, we
randomly divided the data into a training set and a test set, and the overview perfor-
mance is the average results of the multiple rounds experiments. In this experiment,
we utilize the gestures collected in the first round, and we have N users, and set
the number of training samples for each gesture as T = 4. Therefore, the feature
f(g′) for gesture g′ has N ×4 dimensions. To prepare a DTW-based feature for SVM
classifiers, we need around 15ms to compute features of a single testing gesture using
a laptop with an Intel i7-2.8 GHz CPU and 8-GB memory.
Experiment Results. The pink bars in Figure 4.5 show the average EER for each
gesture. The results show that:
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Figure 4.6 The results of participants’ evaluation on both security and usability on
each gesture. ‘100’- best usability/security. ‘0’- worst usability/security.
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Figure 4.7 The usability evaluation (SUS scores) of each gesture.
• The user-defined gesture Sig has the lowest error rate (0.77%). Even partici-
pants may choose the same signature, the accuracy is still high as participants
should have different writing styles.
• Although we observed that most participants chose simple movements, the user-
defined gestures User-defined (UD) have error rate 1.01%,
• The gesture ‘abc’ has an error rate of 1.81%. Although all the participants
wrote the same content, we can identify the owner of each sample. Compared
with other pre-defined gestures, ‘abc’ is more complex and contains distinct
biometric information of participants.
• Other pre-defined gestures have error rates ranging between 2% and 6%.
• The subjective security evaluation matches with the objective EER. The smaller
the EER is, the more secure the authentication is.
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4.5.2 Evaluation on Usability
In this section, we first evaluate the usability of the authentication system from the
survey responses. Then we evaluate the usability of each gestures from both the
subjective aspect reported by the participants and the objective aspect quantified by
the two metrics.
Table 4.5 shows that most participants know or are familiar with depth sensors,
such as Kinect for Xbox. The majority of participants accept mid-air gesture for
authentication, even including the older participants. Responses on open questions
from G-Sample+ show that the reason of the acceptance include convenience, ease-
to-remember, and security. Only few of them have concerns on security, worrying
that mid-air gestures are not as accurate as typing a text password.
Results from Survey Responses
We adopted average system usability scale (SUS) score to evaluate the usability of
the gesture-based authetication. Multiple studies have shown that SUS is a reliable
tool for measuring the usability [99]. It’s a ten-item questionnaire with five response
choices –from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. By combining responses from
10 questions described in literature [99], SUS yields a score from 0 to 100 that is used
to represent the overall usability of the system [99]. A higher SUS score indicates
that a system has higher usability.
G-Sample+. To evaluate the usability of the authentication system, we calculate
SUS scores based on the responses of the first 10 questions for the system. The results
show that the authentication system has an average SUS score of 72.8 (SD = 14.3),
with the experience of performing gestures for 6 weeks. In addition, 64% of the G-
Sample+ participants agree that they would like to use it frequently according to
question 1 in Table 4.4.
To evaluate the usability of each designed gesture, we calculate SUS scores using
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Figure 4.8 The usability evaluation on satisfaction. Responses to: “It is pleasant
to use this gesture.”. Results were grouped by participants from G-Sample+ who
performed gestures and the ones from G-MTurk who learned the system by video
watching.
the responses of the first 10 questions for each gesture. Note that the SUS scores are
references to compare participants’ opinions among different gestures, i.e., the gesture
with a higher score indicates a higher usability than the gesture with a lower score.
Figure 6 shows the average score of participants from G-Sample+ (the blue bars) for
each gesture. Based on the scores, we find that the SUS scores for simple predefined
gestures Swipe, Wave, Circle, Zoom and Grab are close to or greater than 68 (above
average), indicating participants are more willing to use gestures than unwilling[100].
To analyze if different gestures has significant effect on perceived usability, a Repeated
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Figure 4.9 The usability evaluation on learnability. Responses to: “I would need
training to be able to use this gesture.” Results were grouped by participants from
G-Sample+ who performed gestures and the ones from G-MTurk who learned the
system by video watching.
Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was conducted using different gestures
as independent variables and usability as the dependent variable. According to the
result, there was not a significant effect of the gesture type on the perceived usability
at the p < 0.05 level for the seven different gestures [F (6, 175) = 0.69, p = 0.6613],
which suggests that G-Sample+ participants consider all gestures have the similar
usability.
A question in the survey was asked to address satisfaction of each gesture, and a
5-point Likert scale was used, i.e., 5 choices ranging from âĂĲStrongly agreeâĂİ to
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âĂĲStrongly disagreeâĂİ. Figure 7 shows responses of the question in two groups,
respectively. According to the responses of G-Sample+ group, 84% of participants
(highest agreement) consider Circle to be pleasant to use, while 72% of participants
(lowest agreement) feel that Grab is pleasant to use. On average, 77.7% of participants
agree that all the mid-air gestures are pleasant to use. To analyze the satisfactory
difference among different gestures, an ANOVA test was conducted using different
gestures as independent variables and satisfaction as the dependent variable. The test
result shows that there was no significant effect of the gesture type on the perceived
satisfaction at the p < 0.05 level for the seven different gestures [F (6, 175) = 0.34, p =
0.916], which suggests that all gestures may have same level of satisfaction to the
participants.
G-MTurk. We used same evaluation methods to analyze the data from G-
MTurk. The results show that the authentication system has an average SUS score
of 65.6 (SD = 22.1), for which the mean score is lower and the variance is larger than
that from G-Sample+. This may result from the difference between the two samples.
It is also possible that repeated performing gestures over 6 weeks has increased the
perceived usability of the authentication system.
Similar to G-Sample+ group, the usability for each gesture was also calculated
and an ANOVA test was conducted to see if there were significant differences of
perceived usability for the seven gestures. Surprisingly, the test result shows that
there was a significant difference between some gestures on the perceived usability at
the p < 0.01 level [F (6, 420) = 14.84, p = 2.1e− 15]. Post hoc comparisons indicated
that the perceived usability for Sig and ‘abc’ were significantly lower than the first
five gestures Swipe, Wave, Circle, Grab, Zoom. From the results, we suspect that the
Sig and ‘abc’ were considered harder to perform by watching the video, thus have
lower perceived usability. However, for G-Sample+ group, after 6 weeks’ practice,
the perceived usability for Sig and ‘abc’ have increased and considered to have the
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(a) Circle (b) Zoom (c) Grab
(d) ‘abc’ (e) UD (f) Sig
Figure 4.10 Illustration of corner detection results.
same level of usability to other gestures.
To evaluate the satisfaction between different gestures, an ANOVA test was con-
ducted and the result indicated that there was a significant difference between some
gestures on the perceived satisfaction at the p < 0.01 level [F (6, 420) = 2.94, p =
0.008]. Post hoc comparisons indicated that the level of satisfaction for ‘abc’ was
significantly lower than Swipe and Wave. This difference may also be eliminated after
repeated practice for a period.
Results from Gesture Samples
To examine the usability of gestures from an objective perspective, we inspect the
gesture samples, and calculate the number of corners and the number of frames.
Number of Corners. We consider the gestures with a larger number of sharp
changes more complex, e.g., the gesture ′w′ is more complex than the gesture ′o′.
Thus, we use the number of corners of gesture samples to evaluate their complex-
ity. We define the corner of a gesture as the turning point with large curvature
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Figure 4.11 The usability evaluated based on SUS scores from all participants, the
number of corners and the number of frames from G-Sample+.
value. We use a corner detection algorithm based on the curvature scale space (CSS)
detector [101]. We evaluate the gesture trajectory from the index finger, because
trajectories from other fingers are similar. Figure 4.10 illustrated an example results
of the corner detection. The slate bars in Figure 4.11 illustrate the average number
of corners detected by each gesture type. The gestures Swipe, Wave, Circle, Zoom
and Grab are simple (#corners ≤ 3.3), while the gestures ‘abc’, User-defined and
Sig are complex (#corners ≥ 7.8).
Number of Frames. We consider the duration of performing the gesture as a
factor to determine whether a gesture is easy to perform or not. A shorter performing
duration indicates easier to perform. We define the enrolling time as the number of
gesture frames, because the devices’ sample rate is stable. The average numbers
of frames show similar trends as the number of corners, as shown in Figure 4.11
with pink bars. The simple gestures (Swipe, Wave, Circle, Zoom and Grab) have
#frames ≤ 142, and the rest of gestures have #frames ≥ 249.
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Figure 4.12 The correlation between EER and the number of corners [left] and the
number of frames [right].
From Figure 4.11, we can see the number of corners and the number of frames
exhibit consistent trend. What’s more, they are in inverse relationship with SUS
scores in Figure 4.7. The only exception is User-defined. User-defined has similar
number of corners and frames as the ones of Sig, yet User-defined has a higher
usability. We believe it is caused by user preferences: users have the full control in
choosing a relatively complicate gesture yet they feel easy to perform, unlike all other
gestures that are forced upon them.
4.5.3 Security vs. Usability
In this section, we explore the relationship between security and usability based on
the survey responses and quantitative metrics.
Results from Survey Responses
To compare the subjective evaluation of usability and security, we use the SUS scores
from survey questionnaires as usability metric and use the security scores that are
represented by the percentage of participants who consider gestures as “Most secure”
and “Second secure” out of five options (i.e., from least secure to most secure). By
scaling all results to the range of 0 to 100, we show the average scores of each gesture
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from all participants in Figure 4.6. Higher bars indicate better performance for both
usability and security. We observed that the G-MTurk participants consider the
gestures that are easier to perform (e.g., Swipe, Wave, Grab, Circle, and Zoom) as
being less secure, while the gestures Sig and ‘abc’ are considered more secure but
scarified some usability. Participants in G-Sample+ have similar opinions on security
ratings with G-MTurk participants, but consider all gestures as usable, which means
subjective evaluations may change after having practiced on gestures.
Results from Quantitative Metrics
We used the average number of corners and number of frames as evaluation metrics
for usability and EER as a metric for security. To analyze the trade-off between
security and usability, we chose the linear least square fitting technique to model
the relationship between them. As a result, we obtained fitting lines with coefficient
values r = −0.85 (number of corners v.s. EER) and r = −0.88 (number of frames
v.s. EER), shown in Figure 4.12. All gestures roughly follow the inverse relationship
between usability and security. That is, with the increase of the number of corners
and the increase of gesture length, the security performance improves.
In addition, the two plots showed the gesture set can be clustered into two subsets.
One subset consists of gestures ‘abc’, User-defined, and Sig (i.e., the 3 dots at
bottom-right area in both subplots of Figure 4.12), which have a larger number of
corners and number of frames but lower EER values. The other subset consists of
gestures Swipe, Wave, Circle, Zoom, and Grab, which have fewer corners and frames,
but higher EER values. The existence of two subsets indicates the securer gestures
generally do not have better usability in terms of number of corners and gesture
length.
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Figure 4.13 The survey responses to the question of memorability : “I can easily
remember how to perform this gesture.”
4.6 Consistency Study
To evaluate the consistency of each gesture, we collected samples over 6 weeks from
G-Sample+. In general, participants came and contributed data three times per
week for the first two weeks, and twice per week for the next two weeks, and once
per week for the remaining weeks. Most participants finished the entire experiment.
However, some did quit before the end of 6 weeks due to personal reasons. Table 4.3
summarizes the information of each round of data collection: the total number of
participants who contributed data, and the total number of samples, and the time
elapsed after the first batch of data collection (in days).
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Swipe Wave Circle Zoom Grab abc Sig UD
Figure 4.14 [Top] The average number of frames and [Bottom] the average number
of corners of each batch of data.
4.6.1 Consistency from Survey Responses
We asked each participant how likely they could remember the gesture before each
batch of gesture collection, except the first collection. Note that all participants
can remember how they performed each gesture without any hint at each batch of
gesture collection. Figure 4.13 shows the memorability response from the survey.
We observed G-MTurk participants believe that they can remember gestures better
than G-Sample+, as more participants in G-MTurk choose “Strongly agree”. The
G-MTurk group is over-confident of remembering gestures without trying them at
all.
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4.6.2 Consistency on Gesture Samples
We examine the consistency of all types of gestures using the two metrics for quantify
usability: the number of frames and corners. Figure 4.14 shows the average number
of frames and corners by gesture types over 10 batches of collection. Overtime, we
observed that participants become increasingly proficient with each gestures and thus
tend to perform gestures faster and smoother.
4.6.3 Consistency on EER
In this section, we use EER to quantify consistency. We consider the EER values
obtained when the training samples and testing samples belong to the same batch of
data as the baseline. We quantify the changes of two batches of gesture samples by the
difference of two EER (i.e., increase of EER) values: between the baseline EER and
the EER obtained when using the training samples of one batch and testing samples
from the other. A smaller difference indicates a better consistency. In particular,
we ask two questions: (a) Will gestures performed over time change? (b) Will the
change of gestures converge over time? To answer these question, we designed two
experiments.
Consistency over Time. To understand whether the change of gestures is
proportional to the gap between performing gestures, we select batches of samples
that were collected in two consecutive days and in every other days. As we could not
force participants to perform gestures in a tightly-controlled time schedule, we only
managed to find 25 participants who had contributed data in two consecutive days
and 23 participants who had contributed data in every other day. From the results
shown in Figure 4.15, we observe that the baseline EER has the best performance and
the EER increases as the days go by. For almost all gestures, the gestures collected 2-
day-later show a larger variance than the ones collected in the 1st day. The changes
of gestures Sig, ‘abc’, and User-defined are relatively smaller than the simple
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Test in the same day
Test 1 day later
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Figure 4.15 The results of security performance tested by 25 participants one day
later and 23 participants two days later.

















Swipe Wave Circle Zoom Grab abc Sig UD
Figure 4.16 The EER results averaged over each type of gesture. The experiments
are based on the training templates from the first batch of data.
gestures.
Convergence of Gesture Changes. To understand whether the changes across
multiple batches will be reduced over time, we trained SVM classifiers with the sam-
ples from the 1st batch and tested with the ones from the 1st (excluding the training
samples), 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th, etc.
The results are shown in Figure 4.16. We observed the following.
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• The EER results are low when tested in the same day, and increase fast at the
first gap (two days on average), then show convergence around the 5th batch
(10 days on average).
• Sig and User-defined exhibit the best security performance (EER < 6% for
all batches). The reason could be that they are complex gestures, and the
relative changes in terms of the number of corners and frames are smaller than
the other gestures.
• ‘abc’ presents relatively better performance than the rest of simple pre-defined
gestures. It is a complex gesture like Sig but every participant performed the
same gesture, leaving little space to tolerant changes.
• Circle has medium performance. Circle does show less changes of the number
of corners than gesture Swipe or Zoom.
• Swipe, Grab, Zoom, and Wave have the worst performance.
The Number of Gestures to be Remembered. Our experiments involved
two groups of users: 32 participants that required to remember and perform all
gestures and 10 participants that only needed to perform User-defined gestures.
The latter group mimics reality where users choose a few gestures as passwords. To
understand the difference between two groups, we trained SVM classifiers with the
User-defined samples from the 1st batch and tested with the ones from the 1st
(excluding the training samples), 2nd to 9th batch of data. The results are shown in
Figure 4.17, from which we observed that without the burden of remembering other
gestures, the 10 participants can remember the gestures better and their gestures over
time exhibited much better distinctness and consistency.
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Figure 4.17 The average EER results of User-defined gesture using only the first
batch of data for training. ‘UD only’ shows the average results of 10 participants.
‘UD+others’ shows the average results of the other 32 participants.
4.7 Shoulder Surfing Attacks
It is unclear whether mid-air gestures are resilient to shoulder surfing attacks. To gain
insight of shoulder surfing, We recruit 13 subjects as victims and another 4 subjects
as attackers, who mimic each type of the gesture performed by victims. Each victim
enrolled 12 samples for each type of the gestures studied in this chapter, and thus
13 × 132 × 8 victim samples are collected. To mimic shoulder surfing attacks, we
record short videos (e.g., one or two gesture instances) while victims are performing
the gestures.
With the videos, we consider two attack scenarios. In the first scenario, the
attackers are allowed to watch the videos only once, representing the case that they
may happen to see the victim entering gestures once. Then, the attackers entered five
gestures by mimicking what they saw. Specifically, they try 5 times for each shown
gesture. In total, 4 × 5 × 8 attack samples are collected. In the second scenario,
the attackers can watch the videos as many times as they want before or during the
attack. Each attacker attacks X = 10 to 15 times while learning from a recorded
video. In total, we have 4×X × 8 attack samples.










































































































































Figure 4.18 precision recall curves under normal (blue) and attack scenarios. In
general, the attack with multiple times observation has better performance than one
time observation attacks.
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fiers trained with victim samples (used 4 samples for each class). For comparison,
we also tested the classifiers with victim samples which are not used for training.
We use precision recall curves to illustrate the results. By varying the threshold to
reject possible impostors, we obtain precision recall curves that indicate the trade-off
between security and usability. A higher precision indicates a more strict threshold
(i.e., better security), at the cost of letting legitimate users try more times. A higher
recall indicates a less strict threshold and may let some attackers pass authentication,
but legitimate users could pass authentication with a less number of attemps.
The upper-right corner of a curve is the idea point (i.e., 100% precision and
100% recall – all legitimate users are authenticated with one attempt, and all the
attackers are rejected). Figure 4.18 shows precision recall curves of each gesture
types with different types of test sets: normal samples from victims (depicted in
blue), attack samples with multiple times of learning (black), attack samples with
once observing (red). Results of all types of gestures show that attack samples with
one or multiple time observation both have low precision, although multiple learning
did slightly improve the chances of attacks. Nevertheless, the precision and recall are
still relatively low. Thus, the mid-air gestures are difficult to mimic and the shoulder
surfing is not a main thread to our authentication system.
4.8 Related Work
Gestures, as a new way of human computer interaction, have shown great promises,
and an extensive literature on gesture recognition exists, which includes multi-touch
pinch gestures [102], 3D gesture recognition using accelerometer and gyro [103],
multi-layer gesture recognition with Kinect [104], and air gesture identification [105].
These gestures have been applied to a wide variety of fields, ranging from controling
robots [106], computer commands [107], authentication purposes [108, 1, 109], game
control [110] to VR commands [111].
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An increasing number of studies focus on user authenticating based on behavioral
biometrics. Such gestures are embedded in the usage pattern of traditional I/O
devices, and for instance, keystroke dynamics and mouse movement patterns [2, 58]
have shown to be effective in authentication. With the emerge of new technology
(e.g., sensors or touch screens), new gestures were discovered. Lower leg gaits [112]
and hand gesture patterns [112] captured by accelerometers have shown to achieve
high accuracy in user authentication. The Nintendo WiiMote remote controller [113],
which relies on accelerometer sensors and a wrist wearable device [114], has shown
to be able to capture various gestures for user authenticate.
The operations on a smartphone/pad’s touch screen (e.g., writing a word or us-
ing an unlock pattern) can be used to authenticate users either once during logging
in [1] or continuously thoughout the oepration [115]. The security and memorability
of multi-touch gestures for mobile authentication have been studied [116]. Unfortu-
nately, touch gestures can be vulnerable to shoulder surfing or smudge attacks [51].
Several improvements have been proposed to cope with the threats: apply geometric
image transformations to increase the resistance of graphic unlock patterns [117], or
combine multiple graphical-based approaches to leave smudge traces difficult to in-
terpret [118]; or utilize a mobile phone camera running in the background to analyze
whether there is a risk of being watched when entering a password [119].
Mid-air gestures have become a hot topic recently. 3D hand gesture has been
studied on touch-less interactions, such as augmented reality application and game-
based virtual environments [120, 121, 122, 123, 124]. For authentication purpose,
Nigam et al.combined signature gesture captured by Leap Motion and facial infor-
mation by a RGB camera to authenticate a user [66]. Aslan et al. explored two
mid-air gestures for authentication in different situations [90]. AirAuth system eval-
uated the security performance with a set of simple hand gestures captured by a
depth sensor Creative Senz3D [91]. Using Micrsoft Kinect, Hayashi et al.utilized
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fusion data of hand waving gesture and user’s body length for authentication [98],
and Tian et al.used a gesture of whiting signatures in the air [65] for user identifica-
tion. This chapter also investigate mid-air hand gestures, but focuses on quantifying
usability and security of various gestures and exploring their relationship.
Usability evaluation of authentication schemes for other purposes, e.g. password
usage in daily life, Touch-ID on iphone, Biometric authentication on smartphones,
is a well-researched area [125, 126, 127]. Usability is crucial for an authentication
system to be adopted by users [128]. Although there are many papers on mid-air
gesture-based authentication, they mostly focus on improving the accuracy. Only
a few literature explored one or two aspects of usability surrounding gesture-based
authentication: BroAuth [129] present an authentication mechanism based on body
gestures. They evaluate the usability and security of three types of visual feedback
and found that an abstract representation is the best trade-off between security and
usability. Aslan et al. [90] studied 13 participants’ perceptions on two authentication
gestures from the prospective of their emotions. AirAuth [91] compared participants’
pleasantness and excitement level between a set of predefined gestures. They found
a positive correlation between the authentication accuracy and participants’ excite-
ment and pleasantness. This chapter is along the same line, but aims at discovering
general metrics that can quantify both usability and security, and to understand the
relationship between usability and security for guiding gesture evaluation.
4.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter studied the usability and security of a collection of mid-air gestures as
biometrics for authentication. Through a user study that engaged 42 participants to
collect gesture samples 13 times over a 6-week period and a survey conducted by 103
participants, we managed to validate that the quantitative metrics (i.e., the number
of corners, the sample frame length, and the equal error rate (EER)) confirms with
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the subjective scores from the user survey. Further, we find the correlation between
security and usability metrics, which shows that an easy-to-use gesture generally has
a worse security. Thus, we can utilize the number of corners and the sample frame
length to quickly quantify the security of a gesture. Finally, our consistency study





In this dissertation, we studied biometrics of 3D handwriting (write in the air), as we
envision the finger movements that captured by motion sensors are likely to contain
rich personal gesture information. Followed the intuition, we have designed two
behavior-biometric-based authentication systems using 3D handwriting as input.
We designed a KinWrite system to study the authentication performance using
users’ 3D signature – fingertip movement captured from Kinect. We envision that
the MoCRA system can utilize challenge-response mechanism and the independent
writing styles among users – content-independent 3D handwriting – to achieve bet-
ter memorability (no content to be remembered) and meet extra security concerns
(prevent replay, man-in-the-middle attacks). We leverage Leap Motion controllers to
capture more precise finger movements. Finally, we studied the security and usability
trade-off with several types of hand gestures including signatures in-air.
In KinWrite system, 3D signatures can be used as user-friendly passwords as we
only need to store one template for each user. We used Dynamic Time Warping to
calculate the similarity between samples. To evaluate the performance of KinWrite,
we collected over 2000 samples in total over 5 months. In addition, we modeled five
types of attackers who tried to impersonate a legitimate user. The evaluation results
obtained using these samples show a 100% precision, and a 99% recall on average in
the presence of random attackers, e.g., an attacker trying to impersonate a legitimate
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user in a brute force manner; a 100% precision and a 77% recall on average for all
attackers. These results suggest that KinWrite can deny the access requests from all
unauthorized users with a high probability, and honest users can acquire access with
1.3 trials on average.
For MoCRA system, since our scheme does not require a user to write the same
content each time, our scheme authenticates users based on ‘how they write’ instead
of ‘what they write’. To model a user’s handwriting style, we designed a co-occurrence
matrix that built on sets of writing components, i.e., a small, fixed-length trajectory
of fingertip movements, instead of the comparison based on temporal series showed
in KinWrite. We envision that our authentication scheme can be effectively used
in two scenarios: verifying a user against what he/she claims to be combining with
challenge-response scheme, and continuously verifying a user by periodically checking
the writing styles implicitly.
Utilizing Leap Motion, MoCRA captures the user’s writing movements and then
extracts his handwriting style. After verifying that what the user writes matches what
is asked for, MoCRA leverages a Support Vector Machine (SVM) with co-occurrence
matrices to model the handwriting styles and can correctly authenticate users, even
if what they write is completely different every time. Evaluated on data from 24
subjects over 7 months, MoCRA managed to verify a user with an average of 1.18%
(Equal Error Rate) EER and to reject imposers with 2.26% EER.
In the third part, we studied general hand gestures by selecting 11 typical types.
We quantified usability of a gesture by the number of corners and the frame length,
and security as the equal error rate (EER). Meanwhile, we obtained subjective eval-
uation of usability and security by letting users give scores of each gestures. Specifi-
cally, we designed an authentication method that combines Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW) and Support Vector Machine (SVM), and conducted a user study with 42
participants over a period of 6 weeks. In general, usability is in an inverse relationship
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with security, reinforcing the memorization of gestures is necessary to improve the
authentication performance, and shoulder surfing does not help to boost the attacks.
5.2 Future Work
In this paper we focused on how to apply the in-air handwriting style for authentica-
tion. For security concerns, we introduced challenge-response scheme. The challenge
and response matching (i.e., handwriting content matching) is a similar work to hand-
writing recognition work which had be done with off-line writings, on-line writings
(2D), and in-air writings (3D). We will integrate the content matching in the future
work, and include usability studies to show the trade-off between security benefits
and extra effort due to the introducing of CR mechanism.
In addition, as a direction of future work, it is worth performing usability studies
to understand the trade-off between security benefits and extra effort imposed by the
introducing of the challenge-response mechanism.
We note that our experiment results may be different from reality because samples
were collected in a lab environment, where no serious consequence will be incurred if a
user cannot pass the authentication in our study. We envision that after gesture-based
authentication is widely used, the inconsistency of gestures over time will become
smaller because we have observed in our study that repeatedly performing gestures
will help to provide consistent gestures. As a direction of future work, it is worth
exploring whether using gestures every day and with good incentive can encourage a
participant to remember the gestures.
121
Bibliography
[1] S. Uellenbeck et al. “Quantifying the Security of Graphical Passwords: The
Case of Android Unlock Patterns”. In: Proceedings of ACM CCS. 2013, pp. 161–
172.
[2] F. Monrose, M. K. Reiter, and S. Wetzel. “Password hardening based on
keystroke dynamics”. In: Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer
and communications ecurity. CCS ’99. 1999, pp. 73–82.
[3] Y. Zhang, F. Monrose, and M. K. Reiter. “The security of modern password
expiration: an algorithmic framework and empirical analysis”. In: Proceedings
of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. CCS
’10. Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2010, pp. 176–186.
[4] X. Suo, Y. Zhu, and G. S. Owen. “Graphical Passwords: A Survey”. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. AC-
SAC ’05. 2005, pp. 463–472.
[5] J. Cornwell et al. “User-controllable security and privacy for pervasive com-
puting”. In: IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications
(HotMobile). 2007, pp. 14–19.
[6] NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management. “Privacy &
Biometrics: Building a Conceptual Foundation”. In: (2006), pp. 1–57.
[7] A. Kubota. et al. “A Study on Biometric Authentication based on Arm Sweep
Action with Acceleration Sensor”. In: Proceedings of International Symposium
on Intelligent Signal Processing and Communication. 2006, pp. 219–222.
122
[8] J. Liuand L. Zhong, J. Wickramasuriya, and V. Vasudevan. “User evalua-
tion of lightweight user authentication with a single tri-axis accelerometer”.
In: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Human-Computer In-
teraction with Mobile Devices and Services. MobileHCI ’09. Bonn, Germany,
2009, 15:1–15:10.
[9] M. Shahzad, A. X. Liu, and A. Samuel. “Secure unlocking of mobile touch
screen devices by simple gestures: you can see it but you can not do it”. In:
Proceedings of MobiCom. 2013, pp. 39–50. isbn: 978-1-4503-1999-7.
[10] N. Zheng, A. Paloski, and H. Wang. “An efficient user verification system via
mouse movements”. In: Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security. CCS ’11. 2011, pp. 139–150.
[11] A. A. E. Ahmed and I. Traore. “A New Biometric Technology Based on Mouse
Dynamics”. In: IEEE Transaction on Dependable and Security Computing 4.3
(2007), pp. 165–179.
[12] K. Revett. “A bioinformatics based approach to user authentication via key-
stroke dynamics”. In: International Journal of Control, Automation and Sys-
tems 7.1 (2009), pp. 7–15.
[13] R. Dhamija and A. Perrig. “Deja Vu: a user study using images for authentica-
tion”. In: Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium.
SSYM’00. 2000.
[14] S. Wiedenbeck et al. “Design and evaluation of a shoulder-surfing resistant
graphical password scheme”. In: Proceedings of the working conference on Ad-
vanced visual interfaces. AVI ’06. Venezia, Italy, 2006, pp. 177–184.
[15] A. Forget, S. Chiasson, and R. Biddle. “Shoulder-surfing resistance with eye-
gaze entry in cued-recall graphical passwords”. In: Proceedings of the 28th
123
international conference on Human factors in computing systems. CHI ’10.
2010, pp. 1107–1110.
[16] L. D. Paulson. “Taking a graphical approach to the password”. In: Computer
35 (2002).
[17] N. K. Ratha, J. H. Connell, and R. M. Bolle. “Enhancing security and privacy
in biometrics-based authentication systems”. In: IBM Syst. J. 40.3 (2001),
pp. 614–634.
[18] M. Bashir, G. Scharfenberg, and J. Kempf. “Person Authentication by Hand-
writing in air using a Biometric Smart Pen Device”. In: BIOSIG (2011),
pp. 219–226.
[19] F. Tari, A. A. Ozok, and S. H. Holden. “A comparison of perceived and real
shoulder-surfing risks between alphanumeric and graphical passwords”. In:
Proceedings of the second symposium on Usable privacy and security. SOUPS
’06. 2006, pp. 56–66.
[20] Kinect. http://www.xbox.com/en-US/KINECT.
[21] Z. Zhang et al. “Surface roughness vision measurement in different ambient
light conditions”. In: International Journal of Computer Applications in Tech-
nology 39.1/2/3 (Aug. 2010), pp. 53–57.
[22] K. Khoshelham. “ACCURACY ANALYSIS OF KINECT DEPTH DATA”.
In: GeoInformation Science 38.5/W12 (2010), p. 1. url: http://www.isprs.
org/proceedings/XXXVIII/5-W12/Papers/ls2011_submission_40.pdf.
[23] J. Richiardi, H. Ketabdar, and A. Drygajlo. “Local and Global Feature Se-
lection for On-line Signature Verification”. In: Proceedings of the 8th Interna-
tional Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition. ICDAR ’05. 2005,
pp. 625–629.
124
[24] J. Fierrez-Aguilar et al. “An on-line signature verification system based on
fusion of local and global information”. In: Proceedings of the 5th interna-
tional conference on Audio- and Video-Based Biometric Person Authentica-
tion. AVBPA’05. 2005, pp. 523–532.
[25] H. Byun and S-W. Lee. “Applications of Support Vector Machines for Pattern
Recognition: A Survey”. In: Proceedings of the First International Workshop
on Pattern Recognition with Support Vector Machines. SVM ’02. London, UK:
Springer-Verlag, 2002, pp. 213–236. url: http://dl.acm.org/citation.
cfm?id=647230.719394.
[26] N. Cristianini and J. Shawe-Taylor. An introduction to support Vector Ma-
chines: and other kernel-based learning methods. New York, NY, USA: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000.
[27] S. Haykin. Neural Networks: A Comprehensive Foundation. 2nd. Upper Saddle
River, NJ, USA: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998.
[28] J. Fierrez et al. “HMM-based on-line signature verification: Feature extraction
and signature modeling”. In: Pattern Recognition Letters 28 (2007), pp. 2325–
2334.
[29] D. Muramatsu and T. Matsumoto. “An HMM On-line Signature Verifier In-
corporating Signature Trajectories”. In: Proceedings of the 7th International
Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition. Vol. 1. ICDAR ’03. 2003,
pp. 438–442.
[30] A. Jain. “On-line signature verification”. In: Pattern Recognition 35.12 (Dec.
2002), pp. 2963–2972. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0031-3203(01)
00240-0.
125
[31] A. Kholmatov and B. Yanikoglu. “Identity authentication using improved on-
line signature verification method”. In: Pattern Recognition Letters 26.15 (Nov.
2005), pp. 2400–2408.
[32] T. Ohishi, Y. Komiya, and T. Matsumoto. “On-Line Signature Verification
Using Pen-Position, Pen-Pressure and Pen-Inclination Trajectories”. In: Pro-
ceedings of the International Conference on Pattern Recognition. Vol. 4. 2000,
pp. 547–550.
[33] D. S. Guru and H. N. Prakash. “Online Signature Verification and Recognition:
An Approach Based on Symbolic Representation”. In: IEEE Transactions on
Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 31 (2009), pp. 1059–1073.
[34] D. Muramatsu, K. K. Yasuda, and T. Matsumoto. “Biometric Person Au-
thentication Method Using Camera-Based Online Signature Acquisition”. In:
Proceedings of the 2009 10th International Conference on Document Analysis
and Recognition. ICDAR ’09. 2009, pp. 46–50.
[35] V. S. Nalwa. “Automatic On-line Signature Verification”. In: Proceedings of
the IEEE third Asian Conference Computer Vision. 1997, pp. 215–239.
[36] I. Jermyn et al. “The design and analysis of graphical passwords”. In: Proceed-
ings of the 8th conference on USENIX Security Symposium. Vol. 8. SSYM’99.
1999, pp. 1–14.
[37] L. Xia, C-C. Chen, and J. K. Aggarwal. “Human Detection Using Depth In-
formation by Kinect”. In: Workshop on Human Activity Understanding from
3D Data in conjunction with CVPR (HAU3D). Colorado Springs, USA, 2011.
[38] C-C. Cko et al. “CAT motor: an innovative system to detect the behavior
of human computer interaction for people with upper limb impairment”. In:
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Universal access in human-
126
computer interaction: applications and services. UAHCI’07. Beijing, China:
Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 242–250.
[39] D. Uebersax et al. “Real-time sign language letter and word recognition from
depth data”. In: ICCV Workshops. 2011, pp. 383–390.
[40] J. Garstka and G. Peters. “View-dependent 3D Projection using Depth-Image-
based Head Tracking”. In: Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Workshop
on ProjectorCamera Systems (PROCAMS). 2004, pp. 52–57.
[41] J. L. Raheja, A. Chaudhary, and K. Singal. “Tracking of Fingertips and Cen-
ters of Palm Using KINECT”. In: International Conference on Computational
Intelligence, Modelling and Simulation 0 (2011), pp. 248–252.
[42] K. Khoshelham and S. O. Elberink. “Accuracy and Resolution of Kinect Depth
Data for Indoor Mapping Applications”. In: Sensors 12.2 (2012), pp. 1437–
1454.
[43] P. O. Kristensson, T. Nicholson, and A. Quigley. “Continuous recognition of
one-handed and two-handed gestures using 3D full-body motion tracking sen-
sors”. In: Proceedings of the 2012 ACM international conference on Intelligent
User Interfaces. IUI ’12. Lisbon, Portugal: ACM, 2012, pp. 89–92.
[44] E. Stone and M. Skubic. “Evaluation of an inexpensive depth camera for in-
home gait assessment”. In: Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Envi-
ronments ().
[45] R. Plamondon and G. Lorette. “Automatic signature verification and writer
identification - the state of the art”. In: Pattern Recognition 22.2 (1989),
pp. 107–131.
[46] A. Juels and R. Rivest (MIT). “Honeywords: Making Password-Cracking De-
tectable”. In: Proceedings of ACM CCS. 2013, pp. 145–160.
127
[47] M. Gorman. Leap Motion controller review. http://www.engadget.com/
2013/07/22/leap-motion-controller-review/.
[48] C. C. Tappert, C. Y. Suen, and T. Wakahara. “The State of the Art in Online
Handwriting Recognition”. In: IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 12.8
(Aug. 1990), pp. 787–808.
[49] Sharad Vikram, Lei Li, and Stuart Russell. “Handwriting and Gestures in the
Air, Recognizing on the Fly”. In: In Proceedings of the CHI 2013 Extended
Abstracts. Paris, France, 2013.
[50] Rajat Aggarwal ; Sirnam Swetha ; Anoop M. Namboodiri ; Jayanthi Sivaswamy
; C. V. Jawahar. “Online handwriting recognition using depth sensors”. In:
Document Analysis and Recognition (ICDAR), 2015 13th International Con-
ference on. 2015.
[51] E. Mossop A. J. Aviv K. Gibsonand, M. Blaze, and J. M. Smith. “Smudge
attacks on smartphone touch screens”. In: Proceedings of WOOT. 2010, pp. 1–
7.
[52] Leap Overview. https : / / developer . leapmotion . com / documentation /
Languages/CSharpandUnity/Guides/Leap_Overview.html.
[53] How Does the Leap Motion Controller Work? http://blog.leapmotion.com/
hardware-to-software-how-does-the-leap-motion-controller-work.
[54] D.W. DAVIES and W.L. PRICE. Security for computer networks. Chichester,
England: John Wiley, 1984.
[55] Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt. “Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-
Based Protocols Secure Against Dictionary Attacks”. In: IEEE SYMPOSIUM
ON RESEARCH IN SECURITY AND PRIVACY. 1992, pp. 72–84.
128
[56] Lawrence OâĂŹGorman. “Comparing Passwords, Tokens, and Biometrics for
User Authentication”. In: Proceedings of the IEEE. Vol. 91. 12. IEEE, 2003,
pp. 2019–2040.
[57] R.C. Johnson, Walter J. Scheirer, and Terrance E. Boult. “Secure voice based
authentication for mobile devices: Vaulted Voice Verification”. In: Proceedings
of SPIE, Biometric and Surveillance Tech. for Human and Activity Identifi-
cation 8712 (2013).
[58] Z. Jorgensen and T. Yu. “On mouse dynamics as a behavioral biometric for au-
thentication”. In: Proceedings of the ASIACCS2011. Hong Kong,China, 2011.
[59] D. Gafurov, E. Snekkenes, and P. Bours. “Gait Authentication and Identi-
fication Using Wearable Accelerometer Sensor”. In: Automatic Identification
Advanced Technologies, 2007 IEEE Workshop on. 2007.
[60] M. Derawi and P Bours. “Gait and Activity Recognition Using Commercial
Phones”. In: Computers and Security 39 (Nov. 2013), pp. 137–144.
[61] N. Sae-Bae et al. “Biometric-rich Gestures: A Novel Approach to Authentica-
tion on Multi-touch Devices”. In: Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems. CHI ’12. Austin, Texas, USA, 2012,
pp. 977–986.
[62] M. Sherman et al. “User-generated Free-form Gestures for Authentication: Se-
curity and Memorability”. In: Proceedings of the 12th Annual International
Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services. MobiSys ’14. Bret-
ton Woods, New Hampshire, USA, 2014, pp. 176–189.
[63] E. Renshaw M. Gabel R. Gilad-Bachrach and A. Schuster. “Full Body Gait
Analysis with Kinect”. In: Proceedings of EMBC 2012. Annual International
Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society (EMBC),
2012.
129
[64] Eiji Hayashi, Manuel Maas, and Jason I. Hong. “Wave to Me: User Identi-
fication Using Body Lengths and Natural Gestures”. In: Proceedings of the
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems.
[65] J. Tian et al. “KinWrite: Handwriting-Based Authentication Using Kinect”.
In: NDSS. 2013.
[66] Ishan Nigam, Mayank Vatsa, and Richa Singh. “Leap signature recognition
using HOOF and HOT features”. In: Image Processing (ICIP), 2014 IEEE
International Conference on. 2014.
[67] Marius Bulacu, Lambert Schomaker, and Louis Vuurpijl. “Writer Identifica-
tion Using Edge-Based Directional Features”. In: Proceedings of the Seventh
International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition - Volume 2.
ICDAR ’03. Washington, DC, USA, 2003.
[68] Lambert Schomaker. Writer Identification and Verification. Springer London,
2008, pp. 247–264.
[69] Marius Bulacu and Lambert Schomaker. “Writer Style from Oriented Edge
Fragments”. In: Computer Analysis of Images and Patterns: 10th Interna-
tional Conference, CAIP 2003, Groningen, The Netherlands, August 25-27,
2003. Proceedings. Ed. by Nicolai Petkov and Michel A. Westenberg. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003, pp. 460–469.
[70] Sheng He and Lambert Schomaker. “Delta-n Hinge: Rotation-Invariant Fea-
tures for Writer Identification”. In: Proceedings of the 22nd International Con-
ference on Pattern Recognition. IEEE, 2014, pp. 2023–2028.
[71] Fei-Fei Li and Pietro Perona. “A Bayesian Hierarchical Model for Learning
Natural Scene Categories”. In: Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Computer Society
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR’05) - Volume
130
2 - Volume 02. CVPR ’05. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society,
2005, pp. 524–531.
[72] Marius Bulacu, Lambert Schomaker, and Axel Brink. “Text-independent writer
identification and verification using textural and allographic features”. In:
IEEE Trans. on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 29 (2007), p. 2007.
[73] L. Schomaker and M. Bulacu. “Automatic writer identification using connected-
component contours and edge-based features of uppercase western script”. In:
Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE Transactions on 26.6 (2004),
pp. 787–798.
[74] Marcus Liwicki et al. “Writer Identification for Smart Meeting Room Systems”.
In: Document Analysis Systems VII: 7th International Workshop, DAS 2006,
Nelson, New Zealand, February 13-15, 2006. Proceedings. Ed. by Horst Bunke
and A. Lawrence Spitz. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006,
pp. 186–195.
[75] Bangyu Li, Zhenan Sun, and Tieniu Tan. “Online Text-Independent Writer
Identification Based on Stroke’s Probability Distribution Function”. In: Ad-
vances in Biometrics: International Conference, ICB 2007, Seoul, Korea, Au-
gust 27-29, 2007. Proceedings. Ed. by Seong-Whan Lee and Stan Z. Li. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 201–210.
[76] Bangy Li and Tieniu Tan. “Online Text-independent Writer Identification
Based on Temporal Sequence and Shape Codes”. In: ICDAR. IEEE Computer
Society, 2009, pp. 931–935.
[77] C. C. Tappert, C. Y. Suen, and T. Wakahara. “The State of the Art in Online
Handwriting Recognitionr”. In: Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence,
IEEE Transactions on. Vol. 12. 1990, pp. 787–808.
131
[78] Hong Lee and Brijesh Verma. “Binary segmentation algorithm for English cur-
sive handwriting recognition.” In: Pattern Recognition 45.4 (2012), pp. 1306–
1317.
[79] S. Madhvanath and A. Bharath. “HMM-Based Lexicon-Driven and Lexicon-
Free Word Recognition for Online Handwritten Indic Scripts”. In: IEEE Trans-
actions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 34.4 (2012), pp. 670–
682.
[80] Réjean Plamondon and Sargur N. Srihari. “On-Line and Off-Line Handwriting
Recognition: A Comprehensive Survey”. In: IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach.
Intell. 22.1 (Jan. 2000), pp. 63–84.
[81] G. Pirlo G. Dimauro S. Impedovo. “Component-oriented algorithms for signa-
ture verification”. In: International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Arti-
ficial Intelligence 8.3 (), pp. 771–794.
[82] S. N. Srihari J. Park ; V. Govindaraju. “Efficient word segmentation driven by
unconstrained handwritten phrase recognition”. In: Document Analysis and
Recognition, 1999. ICDAR ’99. Proceedings of the Fifth International Confer-
ence on. 1999, pp. 605 –608.
[83] Sheng He; Lambert Schomaker. “A Polar Stroke Descriptor for classification
of historical documents”. In: Document Analysis and Recognition (ICDAR),
2015 13th International Conference on. 2015.
[84] R. E. Woods R.l C. Gonzalez. Digital Image Processing. Prentice Hall, 2008.
[85] T. Joachims. Making large-Scale SVM Learning Practical. Advances in Kernel
Methods-Support Vector Learning, Schölkopf B. and Burges C. and Smola A,
MIT-Press. 1999.
[86] Chih-Chung Chang and Chih-Jen Lin. LIBSVM – A Library for Support Vec-
tor Machines. https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm/.
132
[87] Juan David Hincapié-Ramos et al. “Consumed Endurance: A Metric to Quan-
tify Arm Fatigue of Mid-air Interactions”. In: Proceedings of the SIGCHI Con-
ference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. CHI ’14. Toronto, Ontario,
Canada: ACM, 2014, pp. 1063–1072.
[88] Andrew Cockburn et al. “Air pointing: Design and evaluation of spatial target
acquisition with and without visual feedback”. In: International Journal of
Human-Computer Studies 69(6) (2011), pp. 401–414.
[89] U.S. Food and Drug Administration. “PART 211 CURRENT GOOD MAN-
UFACTURING PRACTICE FOR FINISHED PHARMACEUTICALS and
PART 210 CURRENT GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE IN MAN-
UFACTURING, PROCESSING, PACKING, OR HOLDING OF DRUGS;
GENERAL”. In: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 21. (2015).
[90] Ilhan Aslan et al. “Mid-air Authentication Gestures: An Exploration of Au-
thentication Based on Palm and Finger Motions”. In: Proceedings of the 16th
International Conference on Multimodal Interaction. ICMI ’14. Istanbul, Tur-
key: ACM, 2014, pp. 311–318.
[91] Md Tanvir Islam Aumi and Sven Kratz. “AirAuth: Towards Attack-Resilient
Biometric Authentication Using In-Air Gestures”. In: Extended Abstract CHI
’14. 2014.
[92] ISO/IEC. 9241-14. Ergonomic requirements for office work with visual display
terminals (VDT)s - Part 14 Menu dialogues. 1998.
[93] J. Nielsen. Usability Engineering. Academic Press Inc., 1993.
[94] Leap Motion SDK and Plugin Documentation. https://developer.leap-
motion.com/documentation/index.html.
133
[95] Vennelakanti Ramadevi Madhvanath Sriganesh Freeman Dustin. Freehand
pose-based Gestural Interaction: Studies and implications for interface design.
und. 2012.
[96] Hui Xu, Yangfan Zhou, and Michael R. Lyu. “Towards Continuous and Pas-
sive Authentication via Touch Biometrics: An Experimental Study on Smart-
phones”. In: Proc.of SOUPS ’14. USENIX Association, July 2014, pp. 187–
198.
[97] Jacob O. Wobbrock, Andrew D. Wilson, and Yang Li. “Gestures Without
Libraries, Toolkits or Training: A $1 Recognizer for User Interface Prototypes”.
In: Proc. of UIST ’07. ACM, 2007, pp. 159–168. isbn: 978-1-59593-679-0.
[98] Eiji Hayashi, Manuel Maas, and Jason I. Hong. “Wave to Me: User Identifica-
tion Using Body Lengths and Natural Gestures”. In: Proc. of SIGCHI’14.
[99] John Brooke. SUS: A quick and dirty usability scale. 1996.
[100] J. Sauro. Measuring usability with the system usability scale (sus). Jan. 2013.
[101] Xiao-Chen He and N. H. C. Yung. In: Proc. of ICPR (2). 2004.
[102] Eve Hoggan et al. “Multi-touch Pinch Gestures: Performance and Ergonomics”.
In: Proceedings of the 2013 ACM International Conference on Interactive
Tabletops and Surfaces. ITS ’13. St. Andrews, Scotland, United Kingdom:
ACM, 2013, pp. 219–222.
[103] Grégoire Lefebvre et al. “Inertial Gesture Recognition with BLSTM-RNN”. In:
Artificial Neural Networks: Methods and Applications in Bio-/Neuroinformatics.
Ed. by Petia Koprinkova-Hristova, Valeri Mladenov, and Nikola K. Kasabov.
Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015, pp. 393–410.
[104] Feng Jiang et al. “Multi-layered gesture recognition with kinect”. In: Journal
of Machine Learning Research (2015), pp. 227–254.
134
[105] Mostafa Ghobadi and Ehsan Tarkesh Esfahani. “Adaptive segmentation for
air gesture identification”. In: (2014).
[106] Harish Kumar Kaura et al. “Gesture controlled robot using image processing”.
In: International Journal of Advanced Research in Artificial Intelligence 2 (5
2013).
[107] Ke-Yu Chen et al. “AirLink: sharing files between multiple devices using in-air
gestures”. In: Proc. of UbiComp’14. ACM. 2014, pp. 565–569.
[108] Imtiaj Ahmed et al. “Checksum gestures: continuous gestures as an out-of-
band channel for secure pairing”. In: Proc. of UbiComp’15. ACM. 2015, pp. 391–
401.
[109] Babins Shrestha et al. “Curbing Mobile Malware based on User-Transparent
Hand Movements”. In: (2015), pp. 221–229.
[110] Xbox 360 Healthy Gaming Guide. http://support.xbox.com/en-US/xbox-
360/system/healthy-gaming-guide.
[111] Arun Kulshreshth and Joseph J. LaViola Jr. “Exploring the Usefulness of
Finger-based 3D Gesture Menu Selection”. In: Proc. of SIGCHI’14.
[112] Davrondzhon Gafurov, Kirsi Helkala, and Torkjel SÃÿndrol. “Biometric Gait
Authentication Using Accelerometer Sensor”. In: Journal of Computers 1.7
(2006).
[113] Jože Guna et al. “User identification approach based on simple gestures”. In:
Multimedia tools and applications 71.1 (2014), pp. 179–194.
[114] Juhi Ranjan and Kamin Whitehouse. “Object hallmarks: identifying object
users using wearable wrist sensors”. In: Proc. of UbiComp ’15. ACM. 2015,
pp. 51–61.
135
[115] L. Li, X. Zhao, and G. Xue. “Unobservable Re-authentication for Smart-
phones”. In: NDSS. 2013.
[116] Michael Sherman et al. “User-generated free-form gestures for authentication:
Security and memorability”. In: Proc. of MobiSys ’14. ACM. 2014, pp. 176–
189.
[117] Stefan Schneegass et al. “Smudgesafe: Geometric image transformations for
smudge-resistant user authentication”. In: Proc. of UbiComp ’14. ACM. 2014,
pp. 775–786.
[118] Emanuel Von Zezschwitz et al. “Making graphic-based authentication secure
against smudge attacks”. In: Proc. of IUI’13. ACM. 2013, pp. 277–286.
[119] Mohammed Eunus Ali et al. “Protecting mobile users from visual privacy
attacks”. In: Proc. of UbiComp ’14 Adjunct. ACM. 2014, pp. 1–4.
[120] Eugene M. Taranta II et al. “Exploring the Benefits of Context in 3D Gesture
Recognition for Game-Based Virtual Environments”. In: ACM Trans. Interact.
Intell. Syst. 5.1 (Mar. 2015), 1:1–1:34. issn: 2160-6455.
[121] Kwangtaek Kim et al. “Depth Camera-Based 3D Hand Gesture Controls with
Immersive Tactile Feedback for Natural Mid-Air Gesture Interactions”. In:
Sensors 15.1 (Jan. 2015), pp. 1022–1046.
[122] Siddharth S. Rautaray and Anupam Agrawal. “Vision based hand gesture
recognition for human computer interaction: a survey”. In: 13 (Jan. 2015),
pp. 1–54.
[123] Zhihan Lv et al. “Extending touch-less interaction on vision based wearable
device”. In: Proc. of IEEE VR ’15. IEEE, Mar. 2015, pp. 231–232.
[124] Tran Van Thanh, Dongho Kim, and Young-Sik Jeong. “Real-Time Virtual
Lego Brick Manipulation Based on Hand Gesture Recognition”. In: Advanced
Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering 352 (2015), pp. 231–238.
136
[125] Kevin Iacovino Su Mon Kywe Lorrie Faith Cranor Chandrasekhar Bhagavat-
ula Blase Ur and Marios Savvides. “Biometric Authentication on iPhone and
Android: Usability, Perceptions, and Influences on Adoption”. In: NDSS Sym-
posium 2015. 2015.
[126] Nalin Asanka Konstantin Beznosov Ivan Cherapau Ildar Muslukhov. “On the
Impact of Touch ID on iPhone Passcodes”. In: Proc. of SOUPS. 2015.
[127] Eiji Hayashi and Jason I. Hong. “A Diary Study of Password Usage in Daily
Life”. In: Proc. of ACM CHI. 2011.
[128] E Hayashi H Sasamoto N Christin. “Undercover: Authentication Usable in
Front of Prying Eyes”. In: Proc. of ACM CHI. 2008.
[129] Max-Emanuel Maurer, Rainer Waxenberger, and Doris Hausen. “BroAuth:
Evaluating Different Levels of Visual Feedback for 3D Gesture-based Authenti-
cation”. In: Proceedings of the International Working Conference on Advanced
Visual Interfaces. AVI ’12. Capri Island, Italy, 2012, pp. 737–740.
137
